Different people reason differently, which means that sometimes they reach different conclusions from the same evidence. We maintain that this is not only natural, but rational. In this essay we explore the epistemology of that state of affairs. First we will canvass arguments for and against the claim that rational methods of reasoning must always reach the same conclusions from the same evidence. Then we will consider whether the acknowledgment that people have divergent rational reasoning methods should undermine one’s confidence (...) in one’s own reasoning. Finally we will explore how agents who employ distinct yet equally rational methods of reasoning should respond to interactions with the products of each others’ reasoning. We find that the epistemology of multiple reasoning methods has been misunderstood by a number of authors writing on epistemic permissiveness and peer disagreement. (shrink)

Abstract. Richard Feldman’s Uniqueness Thesis holds that “a body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing set of proposi- tions”. The opposing position, permissivism, allows distinct rational agents to adopt differing attitudes towards a proposition given the same body of evidence. We assess various motivations that have been offered for Uniqueness, including: concerns about achieving consensus, a strong form of evidentialism, worries about epistemically arbitrary influences on belief, a focus on truth-conduciveness, and consequences for peer disagreement. (...) We argue that each of these motivations either misunderstands the commitments of permissivism or is question-begging. Better understanding permissivism makes it a much more plausible position. (shrink)

Dying is (sometimes) bad for the dier because it prevents her from being the subject of wellbeing she otherwise would (the deprivation account). I argue for this from a (plausible) principle about which futures are bad for a prudential subject (the future-comparison principle). A strengthening of this principle yields that death is not always bad, and that the badness of death does not consist in that it destroys the dier.

The first degree entailment (FDE) family is a group of logics, a many-valued semantics for each system of which is obtained from classical logic by adding to the classical truth-values true and false any subset of {both, neither, indeterminate}, where indeterminate is an infectious value (any formula containing a subformula with the value indeterminate itself has the value indeterminate). In this paper, we see how to extend a version of star semantics for the logics whose many-valued semantics lack indeterminate to (...) star semantics for logics whose many-valued semantics include indeterminate. The equivalence of the many-valued semantics and star semantics is established by way of a soundness and completeness proof. The upshot of the novel semantics in terms of the applied semantics of these logics, and specifically infectiousness, is explored, settling on the idea that infectiousness concerns ineffability. (shrink)

In this article, we propose the Fair Priority Model for COVID-19 vaccine distribution, and emphasize three fundamental values we believe should be considered when distributing a COVID-19 vaccine among countries: Benefiting people and limiting harm, prioritizing the disadvantaged, and equal moral concern for all individuals. The Priority Model addresses these values by focusing on mitigating three types of harms caused by COVID-19: death and permanent organ damage, indirect health consequences, such as health care system strain and stress, as well as (...) economic destruction. It proposes proceeding in three phases: the first addresses premature death, the second long-term health issues and economic harms, and the third aims to contain viral transmission fully and restore pre-pandemic activity. -/- To those who may deem an ethical framework irrelevant because of the belief that many countries will pursue "vaccine nationalism," we argue such a framework still has broad relevance. Reasonable national partiality would permit countries to focus on vaccine distribution within their borders up until the rate of transmission is below 1, at which point there would not be sufficient vaccine-preventable harm to justify retaining a vaccine. When a government reaches the limit of national partiality, it should release vaccines for other countries. -/- We also argue against two other recent proposals. Distributing a vaccine proportional to a country's population mistakenly assumes that equality requires treating differently situated countries identically. Prioritizing countries according to the number of front-line health care workers, the proportion of the population over 65, and the number of people with comorbidities within each country may exacerbate disadvantage and end up giving the vaccine in large part to wealthy nations. (shrink)

All parties involved in researching, developing, manufacturing, and distributing COVID-19 vaccines need guidance on their ethical obligations. We focus on pharmaceutical companies' obligations because their capacities to research, develop, manufacture, and distribute vaccines make them uniquely placed for stemming the pandemic. We argue that an ethical approach to COVID-19 vaccine production and distribution should satisfy four uncontroversial principles: optimising vaccine production, including development, testing, and manufacturing; fair distribution; sustainability; and accountability. All parties' obligations should be coordinated and mutually consistent. For (...) instance, companies should not be obligated to provide host countries with additional booster shots at the expense of fulfilling bilateral contracts with countries in which there are surges. Finally, any satisfactory approach should include mechanisms for assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. This assurance enables countries, pharmaceutical companies, global organisations, and others to verify compliance with the chosen approach and protect ethically compliant stakeholders from being unfairly exploited by unethical behaviour of others. (shrink)

Epistemologists often claim that in addition to belief and disbelief there is a third, neutral, doxastic attitude. Various terms are used: ‘suspending judgment’, ‘withholding’, ‘agnosticism’. It is also common to claim that the factors relevant to the justification of these attitudes are epistemic in the narrow sense of being factors that bear on the strength or weakness of one’s epistemic position with respect to the target proposition. This paper addresses two challenges to such traditionalism about doxastic attitudes. The first concerns (...) the relevance of non-epistemic factors we might call "future-comparative" – e.g., that you’ll have more decisive evidence on whether p tomorrow – to the justification of suspending judgment. The second, from Jane Friedman, is to explain the point of the neutral attitude without appealing to inquiry and thus taking goal-related factors, which are not epistemic, such as the value of the goal or the prospects for finding means to achieve it, to bear on the justification of the neutral attitude. My defense of traditionalism relies on distinguishing three ways of being neutral on a question: agnosticism, inquiry and suspension of judgment. Traditionalism is saved because, of these, agnosticism alone is a genuine doxastic attitude. (shrink)

Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

This ~4000 word essay introduces topics of essentialism, as they arise in social sciences. It distinguishes empirical (e.g., psychological) from philosophical studies of essentialisms, and both metaphysical and scientific essentialisms within philosophy. Essentialism issues in social science are shown to be more subtle and complex than often presumed.

Reasons are considerations that figure in sound reasoning. This is considered by many philosophers to be little more than a platitude. I argue that it actually has surprising and far-reaching metanormative implications. The view that reasons are linked to sound reasoning seems platitudinous only because we tend to assume that soundness is a normative property, in which case the view merely relates one normative phenomenon (reasons) to another (soundness). I argue that soundness is also a descriptive phenomenon, one we can (...) pick out with purely descriptive terms, and that the connection between normative reasons and sound reasoning therefore provides the basis for a reductive account of reasons. Like all proposed reductions, this one must confront some version of G. E. Moore’s open question argument. I argue that a reductive view rooted in the idea that reasons figure in sound reasoning is well-equipped to meet the open question challenge head on. (shrink)

Here, I examine the epistemic relation between beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation (e.g., beliefs concerning whether orientation is dispositional) and beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories (e.g., beliefs concerning whether polyamorous is an orientation category). Current philosophical research gives epistemic priority to the former class of beliefs, such that beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories tend to be jettisoned or revised in cases of conflict with beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation. Yet, considering the influence (...) of ideology on beliefs about socially significant phenomena, I argue for an epistemic reversal. (shrink)

Talk of different types of cells is commonplace in the biological sciences. We know a great deal, for example, about human muscle cells by studying the same type of cells in mice. Information about cell type is apparently largely projectible across species boundaries. But what defines cell type? Do cells come pre-packaged into different natural kinds? Philosophical attention to these questions has been extremely limited [see e.g., Wilson (Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, pp 187–207, 1999; Genes and the Agents of Life, (...) 2005; Wilson et al. Philos Top 35(1/2):189–215, 2007)]. On the face of it, the problems we face in individuating cellular kinds resemble those biologists and philosophers of biology encountered in thinking about species: there are apparently many different (and interconnected) bases on which we might legitimately classify cells. We could, for example, focus on their developmental history (a sort of analogue to a species’ evolutionary history); or we might divide on the basis of certain structural features, functional role, location within larger systems, and so on. In this paper, I sketch an approach to cellular kinds inspired by Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory, applying some lessons from this application back to general questions about the nature of natural kinds. (shrink)

Predictive processing theorists have claimed PTSD and depression are maladaptive and epistemically distorting because they entail undesirably wide gaps between top-down models and bottom-up information inflows. Without denying this is sometimes so, the “maladaptive” label carries questionable normative assumptions. For instance, trauma survivors facing significant risk of subsequent attacks may overestimate threats to circumvent further trauma, “bringing forth” concretely safer personal spaces, to use enactive terminology, ensuring the desired gap between predicted worries and outcomes. The violation of predictive processing can (...) go in the opposite direction too, as when depression coincides with energy-depletion, and hence objectively strenuous situations in which things look farther away because they are (accurately anticipated to be) harder to reach. These examples partly encapsulate what predictive processing theorists call “active inference,” yet with differences. In the first case, actions fruitfully obviate predictions rather than fulfilling them. In the second, mental models do not dysregulate bodily processes, making coping harder. Instead, problems (e.g., personal obstacles, gastric illness) deplete energy, eliciting a depressive and adaptive slow-down. Some predictive proponents apply correspondence criteria when alleging mismatches between internal models and the world, while incongruously asserting that the brain did not evolve to see things veridically, but to execute actions. An alternative is to adopt pluralistic, pragmatic epistemologies suited to the complexity of mind. The upshot is that mental outlooks can depart from the norm without epistemically being distorted and that mismatches between anticipatory worries and outcomes, when they actually exist, can be a measure of adaptive and epistemic success. (shrink)

Philosophical debate about the meaning of normative terms has long been pulled in two directions by the apparently competing ideas: (i) ‘ought’s do not describe what is actually the case but rather prescribe possible action, thought, or feeling, (ii) all declarative sentences deserve the same general semantic treatment, e.g. in terms of compositionally specified truth conditions. In this paper, I pursue resolution of this tension by rehearsing the case for a relatively standard truth-conditionalist semantics for ‘ought’ conceived as a necessity (...) modal and proposing a revision to it motivated by the distinctively prescriptive character of some deontic modals. In my view, this puts pressure on a popular conception of one of the core debates of metanormative theory between realists and antirealists. To make good on this claim, I go on to explore two very general ways we might interpret the results of compositional semantics—“representationalism” and “inferentialism”—in order to argue that, contrary to what is generally assumed, both can capture the special prescriptivity of ‘ought’ and both can countenance compositionally specified and informative truth-conditions for ought-sentences. Hence, my main thesis is that the deciding factor between them should not be which of ideas (i) and (ii) we are more impressed by but rather what we think of the relative merits of how representationalism and inferentialism respect these ideas. I’m inclined to favor an antirealist form of inferentialism, but the task I’ve set myself here is mainly to articulate the view in the context of metanormative theory and the semantics of deontic modals rather than try to defend it fully. To this purpose, towards the end I also briefly compare and contrast inferentialism with a third “ideationalist” metasemantic view, which may be an attractive home for some sophisticated versions of metanormative expressivism. Depending on how expressivism is worked out, it may be completely compatible with and so perhaps usefully combined with inferentialism or it may offer a competing way to respect ideas (i) and (ii). (shrink)

In this paper, we use antecedent-final conditionals to formulate two problems for parsing-based theories of presupposition projection and triviality of the kind given in Schlenker 2009. We show that, when it comes to antecedent-final conditionals, parsing-based theories predict filtering of presuppositions where there is in fact projection, and triviality judgments for sentences which are in fact felicitous. More concretely, these theories predict that presuppositions triggered in the antecedent of antecedent-final conditionals will be filtered (i.e. will not project) if the negation (...) of the consequent entails the presupposition. But this is wrong: John isn’t in Paris, if he regrets being in France intuitively presupposes that John is in France, contrary to this prediction. Likewise, parsing-based approaches to triviality predict that material entailed by the negation of the consequent will be redundant in the antecedent of the conditional; but John isn’t in Paris, if he’s in France and Mary is with him is intuitively felicitous, contrary to these predictions. Importantly, given that the trigger appears in sentence-final position, both incremental (left-to-right) and symmetric versions of such theories make the same predictions. These data constitute a challenge to the idea that presupposition projection and triviality should be computed on the basis of parsing. This issue is important because it relates to the more general question as to whether presupposition and triviality calculation should be thought of as a pragmatic post-compositional phenomenon or as part of compositional semantics (as in the more traditional dynamic approaches). We discuss a solution which allows us to maintain the parsing-based pragmatic approach; it is based on an analysis of conditionals which incorporates a presupposition that their antecedent is compatible with the context, together with a modification to Schlenker’s (2009) algorithm for calculating local contexts so that it takes into account presupposed material. As we will discuss, this solution works within a framework broadly similar to that of Schlenker’s (2009), but it doesn’t extend in an obvious way to other parsing-based accounts (e.g. parsing-based trivalent approaches). We conclude that a parsing-based theory can be maintained, but only if we adopt a substantial change of perspective on the framework. (shrink)

Predictive processing theories are increasingly popular in philosophy of mind; such process theories often gain support from the Free Energy Principle (FEP)—a nor- mative principle for adaptive self-organized systems. Yet there is a current and much discussed debate about conflicting philosophical interpretations of FEP, e.g., repre- sentational versus non-representational. Here we argue that these different interpre- tations depend on implicit assumptions about what qualifies (or fails to qualify) as representational. We deploy the Free Energy Principle (FEP) instrumentally to dis- tinguish (...) four main notions of representation, which focus on organizational, struc- tural, content-related and functional aspects, respectively. The various ways that these different aspects matter in arriving at representational or non-representational interpretations of the Free Energy Principle are discussed. We also discuss how the Free Energy Principle may be seen as a unified view where terms that tradition- ally belong to different ontologies—e.g., notions of model and expectation versus notions of autopoiesis and synchronization—can be harmonized. However, rather than attempting to settle the representationalist versus non-representationalist debate and reveal something about what representations are simpliciter, this paper demon- strates how the Free Energy Principle may be used to reveal something about those partaking in the debate; namely, what our hidden assumptions about what represen- tations are—assumptions that act as sometimes antithetical starting points in this persistent philosophical debate. (shrink)

Background: Screen time among adults represents a continuing and growing problem in relation to health behaviors and health outcomes. However, no instrument currently exists in the literature that quantifies the use of modern screen-based devices. The primary purpose of this study was to develop and assess the reliability of a new screen time questionnaire, an instrument designed to quantify use of multiple popular screen-based devices among the US population. -/- Methods: An 18-item screen-time questionnaire was created to quantify use of (...) commonly used screen devices (e.g. television, smartphone, tablet) across different time points during the week (e.g. weekday, weeknight, weekend). Test-retest reliability was assessed through intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs) and standard error of measurement (SEM). The questionnaire was delivered online using Qualtrics and administered through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). -/- Results: Eighty MTurk workers completed full study participation and were included in the final analyses. All items in the screen time questionnaire showed fair to excellent relative reliability (ICCs = 0.50–0.90; all < 0.000), except for the item inquiring about the use of smartphone during an average weekend day (ICC = 0.16, p = 0.069). The SEM values were large for all screen types across the different periods under study. -/- Conclusions: Results from this study suggest this self-administered questionnaire may be used to successfully classify individuals into different categories of screen time use (e.g. high vs. low); however, it is likely that objective measures are needed to increase precision of screen time assessment. (shrink)

Soren Kierkegaard was a profound and prolific writer in the Danish “golden age” of intellectual and artistic activity. His work crosses the boundaries of philosophy, theology, psychology, literary criticism, devotional literature and fiction. Kierkegaard brought this potent mixture of discourses to bear as social critique and for the purpose of renewing Christian faith within Christendom. At the same time he made many original conceptual contributions to each of the disciplines he employed. He is known as the “father of existentialism”, but (...) at least as important are his critiques of his peer Hegel and of the German romantics, his contributions to the development of modernism, his literary experimentation, his vivid re-presentation of biblical figures to bring out their modern relevance, his invention of key concepts which have been explored and redeployed by thinkers ever since, his interventions in contemporary Danish church politics, and his fervent attempts to analyse and revitalise Christian faith. Kierkegaard is regarded by modern contemporaries as somewhat of an intellectual ‘time bomb’, although writing in the early 19th century, Kierkegaards ideas did not explode upon the western intellectual world until the 20th century. Both the contemporary philosophical and theological scenes have been profoundly influenced by this explosion, and chances are that in coming generations writers will still draw insight on some of Kierkegaards unique ideas. His philosophy on religious belief took centuries of philosophical discourse concerning the existence of God and took the discussion in a completely new direction. Up until the writing of Kierkegaard religious philosophy was centered around attempts to ‘prove’ Gods existence via means of a logically consistent, well reasoned argument ala Aquinas’ Five Ways, Anselm etc. To vindicate religious belief, one would traditionally offer some form of structured argument in favour of deity that appealed to reason e.g First Cause, Ontological argument etc, a field which is now known as apologetics-the intellectual defense of religious belief. For Kierkegaard however, reason and faith are a false dichotomy- rational argument and human reason are somewhat irrelevant to religious belief,and this plays a central role in his philosophical doctrine which is an attempt to vindicate Christian faith through his thesis that ‘truth is subjectivity’(Schaeffer, 1982). Firstly, what will be discussed here is a critical evaluation of Kierkegaards philosophy of religious belief as expounded in his works Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Secondly, a look at some responses and criticisms of Kierkegaards religious views- as he was a notoriously ambiguous and vague writer, he wrote the majority of his famous works pseudonymously, his work has been frequently scrutinised. Finally, concluding with an analysis of his philosophy and if we can consider his work a complete vindication of religious belief. (shrink)

This paper offers a short extension of the dialogue between Anselm and the Fool that is contained in "The Ontological Argument Simplified" by Gary Matthews and Lynne Rudder Baker. My extension of the dialogue ends with the Fool proclaiming that "what looks like an argument of elegant simplicity turns out to be no argument at all".

This paper responds to a previous paper by Gary Matthews and Lynne Rudder Baker. Their paper, in turn, was a response to my reply to an even earlier paper of theirs. (The relevant bibliographical details are in this paper.) They claim to have a new, improved, simple ontological argument. I argue that the new, simple ontological argument is not, in any way, improved.

In August 2021, Froese et al. published survey data collected from 2,543 respondents on their subjective experiences living under imposed social distancing measures during COVID-19 (1). The questionnaire was issued to respondents in the UK, Japan, and Mexico. By combining the authors’ expertise in phenomenological philosophy, phenomenological psychopathology, and enactive cognitive science, the questions were carefully phrased to prompt reports that would be useful to phenomenological investigation and theorizing (2–4). These questions reflected the various author’s research interests (e.g., technology, grief, (...) time). Between April 7th and July 31st, 2021, a second questionnaire with the same question set was issued to respondents of the original who had agreed to do a follow-up. This was intended to capture subjective reports of life under social distancing measures a year after the initial survey. By this time–depending on their country of residence and health status–respondents had potentially lived with repeated and prolonged lockdowns and a variety of other restrictions on their social lives. When taken together, Survey I and Survey II provide a cross-cultural and longitudinal dataset that allows for analysis of longer-term impacts of imposed social distancing measures on people’s experiences. For researchers working in diverse disciplines, this dataset offers a rich resource that reflects people’s reactions to the imposition of different social restrictions in different countries and over different time periods. (shrink)

The “scarred villain” trope, where facial differences like scars signify moral corruption, is ubiquitous in film (e.g., Batman’s The Joker). Strides by advocacy groups to undermine the trope, however, suggest cinematic representations of facial differences could be improving with time. This preregistered study characterized facial differences in film across cultures (US vs. India) and time (US: 1980-2019, India: 2000-2019). Top-grossing films by country and decade were screened for characters with facial differences. We found that the scarred villain trope has actually (...) worsened with time, although in tandem with progress in also representing non-villainous characters with facial anomalies. Country of origin did not predict the presence of facial differences in villains or heroes. “Action” and “fantasy” movies were the most likely genres to depict villains with facial differences. Finally, villains’ facial differences crossed more facial subunits and were more likely to involve lips, chin, and mandible than when present in heroes. Our findings underscore the need for critical reflection on the role of cultural practices—even when seemingly innocuous—in shaping and maintaining negative biases against already stigmatized groups. (shrink)

In two studies, we tested how the expression of civic hope in narratives and the perceived authenticity of civic/political actions relate to civic/political engagement. In a cross-sectional study of undergraduates (N = 230), the expression of civic hope predicted the perceived authenticity of civic actions (e.g., voting), which in turn predicted the motivation to engage in them. In a longitudinal on-line study that began 8 weeks prior to the 2020 U.S. Presidential election (N = 308 MTurk workers), overall expressions of (...) civic hope positively predicted the perceived authenticity of voting and the motivation to vote. In addition, expressions of civic hope positively predicted the perceived authenticity of voting, which in turn positively predicted the likelihood of reporting that one did vote. These findings indicate that a sense of civic hope and the experience of authenticity in political contexts may be important for democratic engagement. (shrink)

Groups have committed historical wrongs (e.g., genocide, slavery). We investigated why people blame current groups who were not involved in the original historical wrong for the actions of their predecessors who committed these wrongs and are no longer alive. Current models of individual and group blame overlook the dimension of time and therefore have difficulty explaining this phenomenon using their existing criteria like causality, intentionality, or preventability. We hypothesized that factors that help psychologically bridge the past and present, like perceiving (...) higher (a) connectedness between past and present perpetrator groups, (b) continued privilege of perpetrator groups, (c) continued harm of victim groups, and (d) unfulfilled forward obligations of perpetrator groups would facilitate higher blame judgments against current groups for the past. In two repeated-measures surveys using real events (N1 = 518, N2 = 495) and two conjoint experiments using hypothetical events (N3 = 598, N4 = 605), we find correlational and causal evidence for our hypotheses. These factors link present groups to their past and cause more historical blame and support for compensation policies. This work brings the dimension of time into theories of blame, uncovers overlooked criteria for blame judgments, and questions the assumptions of existing blame models. Additionally, it helps us understand the psychological processes undergirding intergroup relations and historical narratives mired in historical conflict. Our work provides psychological insight into the debates on intergenerational justice by suggesting methods people can use to ameliorate the psychological legacies of historical wrongs and atrocities. (shrink)

The external world sceptic tells some familiar narratives involving massive deception. Perhaps we are brains in vats. Perhaps we are the victim of a deceitful demon. You know the drill. The sceptic proceeds by observing first that victims of such deceptions know nothing about their external environment and that second, since we cannot rule out being a victim of such deceptions our- selves, our own external world beliefs fail to attain the status of knowledge. Discussions of global external world scepticism (...) tend to focus on the second step, where a number of well-known lines of resistance have been offered. But there has been little attention to the first, seemingly innocuous step. That will be the focus of this paper. Part one – sections 1, 2, and 3 – will explain why these standard narratives are not convincing examples of cases where there is no knowledge of the external world. In part two – section 4 – we shall undertake a useful case study. David Lewis’s ‘Elusive Knowledge’ is often thought of as presenting an epistemological vision that is somewhat friendly to external world scepticism: as Lewis himself presents things, there are contexts where external world knowledge ascriptions are uniformly false, and where true knowledge ascriptions are limited to either axiomatic truths or truths about our inner life. We examine his discussion in the light of the preceding reflections and show that the framework he presents is not so concessionary to global external world scepticism after all. (shrink)

This paper explores some consequences of Lewis’s (Australas J Philos 74(4):549–567, 1996) understanding of how knowledge is compartmentalized. It argues, first, that he underestimates how badly it impacts his view. When knowledge is compartmentalized, it lacks at least one of two essential features of Lewis’s account: (a) Elusiveness—familiar skeptical possibilities, when relevant, are incompatible with everyday knowledge. (b) Knowledge is a modality—when a thinker knows that p, there is no relevant possibility where p is false. Lewis proposes compartmentalized knowledge to (...) keep treating knowledge as a modality while mitigating one of its unrealistic epistemological implications: In normal modal epistemic logic (and standard possible world semantics), a thinker always counts as knowing the strongest proposition that follows from the set of all the individual propositions that this thinker knows. Lewis’s compartmentalization proposal is that thinkers merely know the conjunctions of propositions that are known in each of, but not across, their compartments. The irony is that in avoiding overblown knowledge the view now allows for thinkers to attend to skeptical error possibilities and yet knowledge is present. The account avoids inflation of knowledge in one sense only to acquire another type of knowledge the view denies subjects can have. This problem motivates an inspection of knowledge accounts whose intra-compartment closure principles are weaker than those that are valid in normal modal-logic. The conclusion is that some formulations of closure can avoid the challenge Lewis’s view faces. Nevertheless, even these closure principles pose a barrier—perhaps an implausible barrier—for knowledge of ignorance. Even when the reasoning supporting the lack of knowledge is sound, a subject cannot always know she doesn’t know. Interestingly, this obstacle is one that knowledge of knowledge doesn’t seem to face. (shrink)

The principle of epistemic closure is the claim that what is known to follow from knowledge is known to be true. This intuitively plausible idea is endorsed by a vast majority of knowledge theorists. There are significant problems, however, that have to be addressed if epistemic closure – closed knowledge – is endorsed. The present essay locates the problem for closed knowledge in the separation it imposes between knowledge and evidence. Although it might appear that all that stands between knowing (...) the truth of the premises of a valid inference and knowledge of its conclusion is inferring it from the premises, the evidence for each of the premises may jointly count against the conclusion. The intuitive view regarding inferred knowledge says one thing, the evidence says another. One epistemological framework that seems to have the resources to resolve this tension endorses the view that knowledge always requires conclusive evidence. A second framework resolves the tension by limiting the scope of the closure principle. Only inferences drawn directly from propositions contained in the scope of a single knowledge operator are considered closed. The aim of the present essay is to revive the unpopular third option, the idea that knowledge is open. The essay proceeds by arguing that in different ways the two former frameworks only succeed in relocating the problem, not in resolving it. The first framework, the infallibilist view, relocates the problem to a sharp separation between knowledge of the occurrences of events from knowledge of their chance of occurring, a separation leading to several significant additional problems. The fallibilist view, the second framework, in endorsing closure neglects to take into full account the ways in which evidence fails to be transitive. For instance, evidence can count in favor of a conjunction while counting against each of its conjuncts. This fact, which is argued for in the essay on probabilistic as well as non-probabilistic grounds, is used as the foundation of an argument against closed knowledge that can be used as a way to understand several of the most fundamental challenges of epistemology. Not only can an open knowledge view that is based on open evidence resolve all these problems in a simple and natural way, it can also respond to formidable challenges that significantly hinder other open knowledge views. There are good reasons, then, to view both knowledge and evidence as open. (shrink)

The Sleeping Beauty problem—first presented by A. Elga in a philosophical context—has captured much attention. The problem, we contend, is more aptly regarded as a paradox: apparently, there are cases where one ought to change one’s credence in an event’s taking place even though one gains no new information or evidence, or alternatively, one ought to have a credence other than 1/2 in the outcome of a future coin toss even though one knows that the coin is fair. In this (...) paper we argue for two claims. First, that Sleeping Beauty does gain potentially new relevant information upon waking up on Monday. Second, his credence shift is warranted provided it accords with a calculation that is a result of conditionalization on the relevant information: “this day is an experiment waking day” (a day within the experiment on which one is woken up). Since Sleeping Beauty knows what days d could refer to, he can calculate the probability that the referred to waking day is a Monday or a Tuesday providing an adequate resolution of the paradox. (shrink)

The law views with suspicion statistical evidence, even evidence that is probabilistically on a par with direct, individual evidence that the law is in no way suspicious of. But it has proved remarkably hard to either justify this suspicion, or to debunk it. In this paper, we connect the discussion of statistical evidence to broader epistemological discussions of similar phenomena. We highlight Sensitivity – the requirement that a belief be counterfactually sensitive to the truth in a specific way – as (...) a way of epistemically explaining the legal suspicion towards statistical evidence. Still, we do not think of this as a satisfactory vindication of the reluctance to rely on statistical evidence. Knowledge – and Sensitivity, and indeed epistemology in general – are of little, if any, legal value. Instead, we tell an incentive-based story vindicating the suspicion towards statistical evidence. We conclude by showing that the epistemological story and the incentive-based story are closely and interestingly related, and by offering initial thoughts about the role of statistical evidence in morality. (shrink)

People are often offended by beliefs, expect apologies for beliefs, apologize for their own beliefs. In many mundane cases, people are morally criticized for their beliefs. Intuitively, then, beliefs seem to sometimes wrong people. Recently, the philosophical literature has picked up on this theme, and has started to discuss it under the heading of doxastic wrongdoing. In this paper we argue that despite the strength of such initial intuitions, at the end of the day they have to be rejected. If (...) it can be ever truthfully asserted that beliefs wrong, this is always derivative – beliefs wrong only in virtue of other things (like evidence-gathering actions) wronging. We distinguish between modest and ambitious doxastic wrongdoing theories (the former deny, while the latter accept, the possibility of a morally wrong yet epistemically permissible belief); we argue that each of these options faces insurmountable problems; and we offer partly debunking explanations of the intuitions purportedly supporting doxastic wrongdoing. (shrink)

Statistical evidence—say, that 95% of your co-workers badmouth each other—can never render resenting your colleague appropriate, in the way that other evidence (say, the testimony of a reliable friend) can. The problem of statistical resentment is to explain why. We put the problem of statistical resentment in several wider contexts: The context of the problem of statistical evidence in legal theory; the epistemological context—with problems like the lottery paradox for knowledge, epistemic impurism and doxastic wrongdoing; and the context of a (...) wider set of examples of responses and attitudes that seem not to be appropriately groundable in statistical evidence. Regrettably, we do not come up with a fully general, fully adequate, fully unified account of all the phenomena discussed. But we give reasons to believe that no such account is forthcoming, and we sketch a somewhat messier account that may be the best that can be had here. (shrink)

Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 85-103, October 2021.

ABSTRACTIn a recent paper, Michael Pardo argues that the epistemic property that is legally relevant is the one called Safety, rather than Sensitivity. In the process, he argues against our Sensitivity-related account of statistical evidence. Here we revisit these issues, partly in order to respond to Pardo, and partly in order to make general claims about legal epistemology. We clarify our account, we show how it adequately deals with counterexamples and other worries, we raise suspicions about Safety's value here, and (...) we revisit our general skepticism about the role that epistemological considerations should play in determining legal policy. (shrink)

We present a multi-agent system where agents can cooperate to solve a system of dependent tasks, with agents having the capability to explore a solution space, make inferences, as well as query for information under a limited budget. Re-exploration of the solution space takes place by an agent when an older solution expires and is thus able to adapt to dynamic changes in the environment. We investigate the effects of task dependencies, with highly-dependent graph G_40 (a well-known program graph that (...) contains 40 highly interlinked nodes, each representing a task) and less-dependent graphs G_18 (a program graph that contains 18 tasks with fewer links), increasing the speed of the agents and the complexity of the problem space and the query budgets available to agents. Specifically, we evaluate trade-offs between the agent's speed and query budget. During the experiments, we observed that increasing the speed of a single agent improves the system performance to a certain point only, and increasing the number of faster agents may not improve the system performance due to task dependencies. Favoring faster agents during budget allocation enhances the system performance, in line with the "Matthew effect." We also observe that allocating more budget to a faster agent gives better performance for a less-dependent system, but increasing the number of faster agents gives a better performance for a highly-dependent system. (shrink)

We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams’ Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a (...) disjunction. (shrink)

The paper argues that knowledge is not closed under logical inference. The argument proceeds from the openness of evidential support and the dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, to the conclusion that knowledge is open. Without attempting to provide a full-fledged theory of evidence, we show that on the modest assumption that evidence cannot support both a proposition and its negation, or, alternatively, that information that reduces the probability of a proposition cannot constitute evidence for its truth, the relation of (...) evidential support is not closed under known entailment. Therefore the evidence-for relation is deductively open regardless of whether evidence is probabilistic or not. Given even a weak dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, we argue that empirical knowledge is also open. On this basis, we also respond to the strongest argument in support of knowledge closure. Finally, we present a number of significant benefits of our position, namely, offering a unified explanation for a range of epistemological puzzles. (shrink)

The idea that knowledge can be extended by inference from what is known seems highly plausible. Yet, as shown by familiar preface paradox and lottery-type cases, the possibility of aggregating uncertainty casts doubt on its tenability. We show that these considerations go much further than previously recognized and significantly restrict the kinds of closure ordinary theories of knowledge can endorse. Meeting the challenge of uncertainty aggregation requires either the restriction of knowledge-extending inferences to single premises, or eliminating epistemic uncertainty in (...) known premises. The first strategy, while effective, retains little of the original idea—conclusions even of modus ponens inferences from known premises are not always known. We then look at the second strategy, inspecting the most elaborate and promising attempt to secure the epistemic role of basic inferences, namely Timothy Williamson’s safety theory of knowledge. We argue that while it indeed has the merit of allowing basic inferences such as modus ponens to extend knowledge, Williamson’s theory faces formidable difficulties. These difficulties, moreover, arise from the very feature responsible for its virtue- the infallibilism of knowledge. (shrink)

We present a minimal pragmatic restriction on the interpretation of the weights in the “Equal Weight View” regarding peer disagreement and show that the view cannot respect it. Based on this result we argue against the view. The restriction is the following one: if an agent, $$\hbox {i}$$ i, assigns an equal or higher weight to another agent, $$\hbox {j}$$ j,, he must be willing—in exchange for a positive and certain payment—to accept an offer to let a completely rational and (...) sympathetic $$\hbox {j}$$ j choose for him whether to accept a bet with positive expected utility. If $$\hbox {i}$$ i assigns a lower weight to $$\hbox {j}$$ j than to himself, he must not be willing to pay any positive price for letting $$\hbox {j}$$ j choose for him. Respecting the constraint entails, we show, that the impact of disagreement on one’s degree of belief is not independent of what the disagreement is discovered to be. (shrink)

It is hardly a novel claim that the work of Ursula K. Le Guin (1929–2018) contains influences from philosophical Daoism, but I argue that this influence has yet to be fully understood. Several scholars criticize Le Guin for misrepresenting Daoist ideas as they appear in ancient Chinese philosophical texts, particularly the Dao De Jing and the Zhuangzi. While I have sympathy for this charge, especially as it relates to Le Guin’s translation of the Dao De Jing, I argue that it (...) fails to understand the extent to which her fiction contains her own philosophical development of Daoist ideas. Looking at some of her most influential works (e.g., The Left Hand of Darkness, The Dispossessed, The Lathe of Heaven, A Wizard of Earthsea, etc.), I suggest that Le Guin’s fiction is better seen as a refocusing of Daoist concepts such as complementary contrasts and non-action (wu wei) in the contexts of modern feminism, modern anarchism, science fiction, and fantasy. Le Guin was not trying to represent ancient Daoism as a scholar. Rather, she was trying to reimagine Daoism as a creative artist and philosopher in her own right. This way of viewing Le Guin’s work does not fully exorcise the specter of the possibility of Orientalist cultural appropriation, but it does make the issue more complex in a way that can deepen further conversations. To what extent can an artist be guilty of misrepresentation if representation was not, strictly speaking, her goal? I end with a brief reflection on what is perhaps the deepest philosophical lesson of Le Guin’s work: everything is more complicated than it first appears. On that note, the present article is an attempt not just to do philosophy about Le Guin, but to do philosophy in a Le Guinian fashion, which requires rethinking the metaphor of combat that guides much academic philosophy today. (shrink)

Before the semester begins, a teacher tells his students: “There will be exactly one exam this semester. It will not take place on a day that is an immediate-successor of a day that you are currently in a position to know is not the exam-day”. Both the students and the teacher know – it is common knowledge – that no exam can be given on the first day of the semester. Since the teacher is truthful and reliable, it seems that (...) the students can know that what he says is true. However, in that case, assuming the students can know that they know whatever it is they know (KK) and assuming their knowledge is closed under entailment (closure), the students can reason from what they know to the conclusion that no exam will take place during the semester. This conclusion contradicts what they supposedly know: that there will be an exam. This puzzle, we argue, gives rise to a new consideration for the rejection of KK. We discuss unique features of the argument, especially in comparison to Timothy Williamson's rejection of KK in light of other versions of the surprise exam paradox. (shrink)

Harman and Lewis credit Kripke with having formulated a puzzle that seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. The puzzle is widely regarded as having been solved. In this paper we argue that this standard solution, in its various versions, addresses only a limited aspect of the puzzle and holds no promise of fully resolving it. Analyzing this failure and the proper rendering of the puzzle, it is suggested that it poses a significant challenge for the defense of epistemic closure.

We explore consequences of the view that to know a proposition your rational credence in the proposition must exceed a certain threshold. In other words, to know something you must have evidence that makes rational a high credence in it. We relate such a threshold view to Dorr et al.’s :277–287, 2014) argument against the principle they call fair coins: “If you know a coin won’t land tails, then you know it won’t be flipped.” They argue for rejecting fair coins (...) because it leads to a pervasive skepticism about knowledge of the future. We argue that the threshold view of evidence and knowledge gives independent grounds to reject fair coins. (shrink)

There are few indulgences academics can crave more than to have their work considered and addressed by leading researchers in their field. We have been fortunate to have two outstanding philosophers from whose work we have learned a great deal give ours their thoughtful attention. Grappling with Stephen Yablo’s, and Juan Comesaña’s comments and criticisms has helped us gain a better understanding of our ideas as well as their shortcomings. We are extremely grateful to them for the attentiveness and seriousness (...) with which they have considered our arguments and to philosophical studies for giving us this opportunity. Given the substantive difference between the two response papers, there is not much beyond sincere gratitude that we can covey to them jointly. We will therefore address them in turn. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the principle should be rejected. We analyze Williamson's argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against. After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.

We offer two arguments against the halving repose to Sleeping Beauty. First, we show that halving violates the Epistemological Sure-Thing Principle, which we argue is a necessary constraint on any reasonable probability assignment. The constraint is that if hypothetically on C you assign to A the same probability you assign to A hypothetical on not-C, you must assign that probability to A simpliciter. Epistemically, it's a sure thing for you that A has this probability. Second, we show that halving violates (...) solid statistical reasoning (or draws absurdly irrelevant distinctions). (shrink)

What is the relationship between perception and mental imagery? I aim to eliminate an answer that I call perceptualism about mental imagery. Strong perceptualism, defended by Bence Nanay, predictive processing theorists, and several others, claims that imagery is a kind of perceptual state. Weak perceptualism, defended by M. G. F. Martin and Matthew Soteriou, claims that mental imagery is a representation of a perceptual state, a view sometimes called The Dependency Thesis. Strong perceptualism is to be rejected since it (...) misclassifies imagery disorders and abnormalities as perceptual disorders and abnormalities. Weak Perceptualism is to be rejected since it gets wrong the aim and accuracy conditions of a whole class of mental imagery–projected mental imagery–and relies on an impoverished concept of perceptual states, ignoring certain of their structural features. Whatever the relationship between perception and imagery, the perceptualist has it wrong. (shrink)

This paper gives an outline of truthmaker semantics for natural language against the background of standard possible-worlds semantics. It develops a truthmaker semantics for attitude reports and deontic modals based on an ontology of attitudinal and modal objects and on a semantic function of clauses as predicates of such objects. It also présents new motivations for 'object-based truthmaker semantics' from intensional transitive verbs such as ‘need’, ‘look for’, ‘own’, and ‘buy’ and gives an outline of their semantics. This paper is (...) a commissioned 'target' article, with commentaries by W. Davis, B. Arsenijevic, K. Moulton, K. Liefke, M. Kaufmann, R. Matthews, P. Portner and A. Rubinstein, P. Elliott, G. Ramchand and my reply. (shrink)

This is a reply to the commentaries on my paper 'Truthmaker Semantics for Natural Language: Attitude Verbs, Modals, and Intensional Transitive Verbs'. The paper is a commissioned 'target' article, with commentaries by W. Davis, B. Arsenijevic, K. Moulton, K. Liefke, M. Kaufman, R. Matthews, P. Portner and A. Rubinstein, P. Elliott, and G. Ramchand.

Predication is a lingual relation. We have this relation when a term is said (λέγεται) of another term. This simple definition, however, is not Aristotle’s own definition. In fact, he does not define predication but attaches his almost in a new field used word κατηγορεῖσθαι to λέγεται. In a predication, something is said of another thing, or, more simply, we have ‘something of something’ (ἓν καθ᾿ ἑνὸς). (PsA. , A, 22, 83b17-18) Therefore, a relation in which two terms are posited (...) to each other in a way that one is said (predicated) of the other is a predication. The term of which the other term is said is called a subject (ὑποκειμένον) and the other, which is said about the subject, is called the predicate. Thus, in a predication the predicate is predicated of the subject; given that being predicated is almost as the same as being said. The relation between being said and being predicated is so close that ‘if something is said of a subject both its name and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject.’ (Cat., 5, 2a19-26) This, however, is true only about the second genera and not the accidents. a) Nature of relation in predication What is Aristotle’s theory about the nature of the relation in a predication? How does he fundamentally understand this relation? Phil Corkum distinguishes between predication logic and traditional term logic and argues that the relation between subject and predicate in Aristotle is of the latter kind. While in predicate logic, subjects and predicates have distinct roles, they have the same role in traditional term logic. In predication logic, subjects refer, but predicates characterize. Thereupon, a sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. In traditional term logic, both subjects and predicates refer and a sentences expresses a truth if both name one and the same thing. He concludes that Aristotle ‘problematically conflates prediction and identity claims’ because while he thinks both subjects and predicates refer, he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and the predicate name one and the same thing. Based on this, Corkum believes that Aristotle’s core semantic is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution, which is a mereological interpretation: ‘All men are mortal’ is true just in case the mereological sum of humans is part of the mereological sum of mortals. b) Aristotle’s theory of predication: one or two theories? Frank Lewis finds an inconsistent gap between the theory of predication in the Categories and that in the later books of the Metaphysics VII, 6. So too Joan Kung, Terry Irwin, Daniel Graham. c) Distinction of ‘being said of’ and ‘being in’ Owen enumerates the texts in which Aristotle’s distinction between ‘being said of’ and ‘being in’ is asserted: OI. 11b38-12a17; To., 127b1-4; Cat. 1a20-b9; 2a11-14; 2a27-b6; 2b15-17; 3a7-32; 9b22-24 d) Predication in Aristotle and the standard ‘S is P’ Marie De Rijk Lambertus thinks that the ‘S is P’ pattern is misleading when it comes to express predication in Aristotle. In his view, ‘The Aristotelian procedure should be described in terms of appositively assigning an attribute (κατηγορούμενον) to a substrate (ὑποκείμενον), rather than ascribing a predicate to a subject by means of a copula…. The comment should be considered an attribute which is said to fall to a substrate, without understanding this procedure in terms of sentence predication.’ e) Aristotle’s predication: bipartite or tripartite? It is a difficulty to make Aristotle’s theories of name-verb predication and tripartite predication consistent. The reason is that tripartite is not consistant with his name-verb structure based on which he says that the predicate term is the ‘verb.’ (20a31; 20b1-2; 16a13-5) The problem is that in a tripartite form like ‘Socrates is white’ we cannot take ‘is white’ as the verb because, based on Aristotle himself, no part of a verb can be significant itself. (16b6-7) However, his assertions about the equivalences between the two structures (OI. 12, 21b9-10; PrA. 51b13-16; Met., 1017b22-30) must mean that they are not inconsistent in his own view. Thus, as Allen Bāck points, ‘Aristotle seems to think that he has a single, consistent theory.’ The sense of saying or speaking as the root sense of rhema makes the relation between predication (saying something of something) and verb more interesting. The use of rhema in the sense of a long expression approves this. In Plato’s work (399ac) where Socrates claims that the name anthropos derives from anthron ha opopen (‘he who examines what he has seen’) we have an onoma from, or in place of, a rhema. 1) Subject The subject (ὑποκειμένον) is that of which another term is said or predicated. Aristotle’s own definition is of a much more philosophical value: ‘By subject I mean that which is expressed by an affirmative term (λέγω δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ κάταφάσει δηλούμενον).’ (Met., K, 1067b18) Throughout Aristotle’s work, three kinds of subjects can be found: possible, prime and absolute subject. a) Possible subject Those things that can take the position of a subject in a predication we call possible subjects, no matter they can or cannot take the position of predicate in any predication. All terms except the ultimate predicates are possible subjects because they can take the position of subject. b) Prime subject Those that in any predication can only take the position of a subject and not the position of a predicate are prime subjects. (Cat., 5, 3a36-b2; Met., Z, 1028b36-1029a1) This is the truest sense of subject and belongs only to substances. (Met., Z, 1029a1-2) In fact, ‘that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated’ is a substance. (Met., Z, 1029a7-9) In Categories, besides primary substances (Cat., 2, 1b3-6), individual qualities are also said not to be able to be said of anything else. (Cat., 2, 1a23-29) Aristotle’s examples are a certain ‘knowledge-of-grammar’ (τὶς γράμματικὴ) and ‘an individual white’ (τὸ τὶ λευκὸν). Thus, although substances are indeed in the truest sense individuals and, thereby, in the truest sense primary subjects, other individuals can take the position of subject as well. c) Absolute subject While substances are prime subjects of all other things, there is still something of which substances can be predicated and this predication is not an accidental predication: matter. (Met., Z, 1029a21-24) This predication is, indeed, the predication of a ‘form or this’ on matter and material substance. (Met., Θ, 1049a34-36) The only thing that is absolutely a subject, therefore, and can be a predicate is prime matter (πρώτη ὓλη). (Met., Θ, 1049a24-27) d) Subject and substance The most important thing in being a substance is being a subject: ‘It is because the primary substances are subjects for all the other things and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them, that they are called substances most of all.’ (Cat., 5, 2b15-17) And what is nearer to this position is more a substance as a species is more a substance than a genus.’ (Cat., 5, 2b7-8) e) Primary versus accidental subject A subject is a primary subject in a predication when the predicate is predicated of it as itself. In such a case, the subject is the subject of the predicate qua itself and not qua something else. A subject, on the one hand, is an accidental subject when it is not the primary subject of the predicate that is predicated on it. It means that a subject is an accidental subject when the predicate is predicated of it not qua itself but qua something else. An accidental subject is, therefore, anything other than a substance. 2) Predicate as universal It is evident from our discussion of kinds of subjects that except matter, primary substances (if we ignore both accidental predication and cases of absolute subjects) and other individuals, everything else can take the position of a predicate. Since primary substances are individuals, it results that everything except matter and individuals are capable to take the position of predicate. The immediate consequence of this is that the predicate must be a universal. When individuals cannot take the position of predicate, this position cannot be taken by any particular. Therefore, only universals can be predicated of others. Moreover, albeit universals can be a simple subject (for another universal), they are not prime subjects. The closeness of universal and predicate is to the extent that Aristotle differentiates universal from subject. (Met., Θ, 1049a27-30) 3) Categories or classes of predicates Aristotle distinguishes ten highest classes into one of which each predicate must necessarily fall: substance (or what a thing is), quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, activity and passivity. (Cat., 4, 1b25-27; To., I, 9, 103b20- ; PsA., A, 22, 83b13-23) The substance counted among predicates must refer to secondary and not primary substances not only because Aristotle insists that primary substances cannot be predicated but also from his own examples of the category of substance: man and animal. (To., I, 9, 103b25) However, if a predicate be asserted of itself or its genus be asserted of it, the predicate signifies substance or what is; but if ‘one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind,’ it signifies one of the other nines. (To., I, 9, 103b30) These categories are so comprehensive that no predicate can remain outside them so that even non-being has as many senses as categories. (Met., M, 1089a26-30) a) That whether Aristotle’s categories are merely linguistic or fundamentally ontological is a so much controversial dispute. Some like G. E. R. Lloyd believe that ‘categories are primarily intended as a classification of reality … rather than of the signifying terms themselves.’ b) Although Aristotle’s categories have been historically regarded as a classification of predications, there are some recent commentators like Jonathan Barnes that think it is classifying predicates and not predications. 4) Kinds of predicates In his introduction of Categories, as J. W. Thorp truly points out , Aristotle distinguishes between the category of substance and the other categories using μὲν ... δὲ construction. This construction illustrates that beside tenfold classification of categories, there is an even more crucial differentiation between two kinds of predicates: substance or what is on the one hand and the other nine ones on the other hand: the distinction between what is predicated of the subject as what it is and what is predicated of it as an accident. Therefore, we have three kinds of classification - a twofold, a fourfold and a tenfold-complicatedly classifying the same thing, viz. the predicate. Predicates can be divided also to four kinds: property, definition, genus and accident. (To., I, 4, 101b11-20) A property is that predicate that is convertible with its subject and does not signify its essence. A definition is that predicate that is convertible with its subject and signifies its essence. It is a genus if it is not predicated convertibly and is contained in the definition of its subject. And it is an accident if it is neither convertible nor contained in the definition of its subject. (To., I, 8, ^103b3) All of these four kinds are among categories. (To., I, 9, 103b20) It seems that there might be some kind of relation between the twofold and the fourfold distinction: whereas genus and definition are predicated as what it is, accidents are not so predicated. There seems to be some rules that determine to each of these four kinds each predicate belongs. At To., IV, 123b30ff. Aristotle asserts: ‘If B has a contrary and A does not, then B does not belong to A as its genus.’ There is a dispute around per se accidents (τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα) (Topics., 102a18) whether they must be regarded as either of the four kinds or as a fifth kind. Barnes (1970) argued that they ‘do not fit at all neatly into the fourfold classification.’ He argues that based on the definition of accidents at A, 5, 102b4-5, they must be accidents but based on another definition, A, 5, 102b6-7, they cannot be accidents. He also defends the view that they are not properties. Barnes concludes: ‘This shows that the two definitions are not equivalent, and hence that the ‘predicables’ are not well-defined.’ Demetris J. Hadgopoulos defends the view that the two definitions of accidents are equivalent and per se accidents are properties. 5) Five types of predications We have five kinds of predications based on our division of subjects and our discussion of predicates: simple, primary (itself divided to substantial and accident), accidental (itself divided to primary and secondary), aoincidental and absolute predication. a) Simple predication. This is a predication in which a universal is predicated of either a particular or a universal subject. This sense of predication includes all other senses except the first kind of accidental predication. b) Primary predication. This is a predication in which a universal is predicated of a primary subject, namely a substance. A primary predication is of two kinds: i) Substantial predication. A primary predication in which the predicate is part of, or is included in, the definition of the subject. The universal that is the predicate here is the definition or the genus or the species or the diferentia of the subject. It is this predication that Aristotle calls a unity: ‘A statement may be called a unity … because it exhibits a single predicate as inhering not accidentally in a single subject.’ (PsA., B, 10, 93b35-37) It is only substantial predicates that can be predicated of each other: ‘Predicates which are not substantial are not predicated of one another.’ (PsA., A, 22, 83b18-19) Aristotle defines a substantial predication also in another way. A predication in which a higher genus is predicated on a lower genus, species, a substance or an individual, (or a species is predicated on an individual) is a substantial predication. Therefore, a substantial predication is a predication in a series that has individuals on one of its ends and a general category on its other end. In fact, only substantial predicates can be predicated of one another. (PsA., A, 22, 83b17-19) This series cannot be an infinite series because otherwise not only substances would not be definable but also a genus would be equal to one of its own species. (PsA., A, 22, 83b7-10) -/- ii) Accident predication. A primary predication in which the predicate is not part of, or is not included in, the definition of its subject. The universal that is the predicate here is the property or the accident of the subject. c) Accidental predication. This is a predication in which the subject is not a primary subject and its predicate is a substance. This predication is of two kinds: i) Primary accidental predication. This is a predication in which an accident is predicated of substance. Such a predication can go ad infinitum, which is inferable from Aristotle’s assertion that the secondary accidental predication cannot go ad infinitum. ii) Secondary accidental predication. It is a predication in which an accident is predicated of another accident. Such a predication, Aristotle asserts, cannot go ad infinitum because even more than two accidents cannot be combined. Now what is the meaning of Aristotle’s assertion that we cannot continue this ad infinitum? Does it mean that we cannot continue the predication ‘The musician is white’ and say ‘The white is Athenian?’ But why not? Or maybe he means that by adding any predication, we are still in a condition of predicating two accidents of a substance on each other. -/- As primary subjects, substances can also take the position of predicate though not essentially but accidentally. In propositions like ‘the white is a log’ or ‘That big thing is a log’ we observe substance taking the position of predicate but this is only accidentally: ‘When I affirm ‘the white is a log,’ I mean that something which happens to be white is a log- not that white is the subject in which log inheres (οὐχ ὡς τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῷ ξύλῳ τὸ λευκόν ἐστι), for it was not qua white or qua a species of white that the white (thing) came to be a log (οὔτε λευκὸν ὄν οὔθ᾿ ὃπερ λευκόν τι ἐγἐνετο ξύλον), and the white (thing) is consequently not a log except incidentally.’ (PsA., 22, 83a3-9) Aristotle compares this accidental use of substance in the position of predicate with the substantial use of it in the place of a subject: ‘On the other hand, when I affirm ‘the log is white,’ I do not mean that something else, which happens to be a log, is white (οὐχ ὃτι ἓτερόν τί ἐστι λευκόν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ συμβέβηκε ξύλῳ εἶναι), (as I should if I said ‘the musician is white,’ which would mean ‘The man who happens also to be a musician is white’); on the contrary, log is here the subject- the subject which actually came to be white, and did so qua wood or qua a species of wood and qua nothing else.’ (PsA., 22, 83a8-14) Aristotle asks us not to call propositions like ‘The white is a log’ a predication at all or at least call them accidental predication instead of simple (ἁπλως) predication. (PsA., A, 22, 83a14-17) An accidental predication, in which we have a substance in the place of predicate, is different from an essential predication in that while the subject of an accidental predication is said to be the predicate not by itself but as something different with which it coincides, the subject of an essential predicate is said to be the predicate by itself and not because it is something else: ‘Since there are attributes which are predicated of a subject essentially and not accidentally- not, that is, in the sense in which we say ‘That white (thing) is a man,’ which is not the same mode of predication as when we say ‘The man is white’: the man is white not because he is something else but because he is man, but the white is man because ‘being white’ coincides with ‘humanity’ within one subject. Therefore, there are terms such as are essentially subjects of predicates. (PsA., A, 19, 81a24-29) This capability of ‘non-essentially and only accidentally’ being a subject does belong, in fact, to all sensible things. (PsA., A, 27a32-36) d) Coincidental predication. this is a predication in which none of the subject and predicate are a substance or an individual. In this predication, one of the accidents of a substance or individual is predicated of one of the other accidentals of the same substance or individual. For example, when it is said that ‘The white is musical,’ there is an individual, say Socrates, for which both of white and musical are accidents. e) Absolute predication. This is a predication in which a form or a substance is predicated of a matter or a material substance. Some commentators like Loux and Lewis regarded this predication as close to accident predication, both based on inherence. As R.M. Dancy points out, these predications make Aristotle’s theory of predication immanentist: not only accident predications are explained by the immanence of accidents in substances, some of the substantial predications, which were not explained in Categories, are also explained by the immanence of form in matter. It is interesting that in this kind of predication, it is the predicate and not the subject, which is in the strictest sense substance. As the central books of Metaphysics claim, the form is the substance. Thus, in this predication, substance gets away from the sense of ὑποκείμενον. Corkum mentiones 68a19 as the only instance where Aristotle explicitly claims that a term may be predicated of itself, a passage that is, in Corkum’s view, problematic. 6) Demonstrable predicates Those predicates are demonstrable that are so related to their subjects that there are other predicates prior to them predicable of their subjects (ἔτι δ᾿ ἄλλος, εἰ ὧν πρότερα ἄττα κατηγορεῖται). (PsA., A, 22, 83b32-34) 7) Series of predications Since it is possible for a predicate to be itself the subject of another predication, we can have a series of predications in which the predicate of a predication is the subject of the next predication. This series has the following features: a) It has a limit (in number) (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) on the side of subjects: there are subjects that cannot themselves be predicated (PsA., A, 27, 43a39-41), which are, as we noted, prime subjects: particulars, i.e. prime substances and other individuals. (PsA., A, 19-22) Aristotle calls them ultimate (ὓστατον). (PsA., 21, 82a36-b1) b) It has a limit (in number of kinds) (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) also on the side of predicates: there must be predicates that cannot be subjects. (PsA., A, 19-22; PsA., A, 27, 43a36-39) Aristotle calls them primary (πρῶτον). (PsA., A, 21, 82b1-4) These are the highest categories or the highest genera of categories. (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) c) The series has an escalating shape from mere subjects at its downside to mere predicates at its upside. It is Aristotle himself whos uses the words up and down in this sense. (e.g. PsA., A, 22, 83b2-3) d) The predications that lie between lowest and highest ones must be finite in number. (PsA., A, 19-22 especially: 20, 82a21-35) These have subjects and predicates, each capable of both of the roles of being subject and being predicated. A result of this fitness is that neither demonstration can go to infinity nor everything is demonstrable, the two points Aristotle always insist on. e) The upward side includes the more universal ones and the downward the more particular ones. (PsA., 20, 82a21-23) f) It follows from the above features that ‘neither the ascending nor the descending series of predications … are infinite.’ (PsA., A, 22, 83b24-25) g) Reciprocation and convertibility. Except in case of terms (i.e. subjects and predicates) that are at each of the ends of series of predications, namely ultimates and primaries, it is possible to reciprocate (ἀντιστρέφειν) terms and convert the predication. (PsA., A, 19, 82a15-20) h) Antipredication. Antipredication means that in a predication (S is P), the subject becomes the predicate of its predicate (P is S) in the same category its predicate was predicated on it. For example, if P is in the category of quality, antipredication means that S be predicated of P in the category of quality. In other words, P is a quality of S and S is a quality of P. Aristotle rejects this. (PsA., A, 22, 83a36-b3) i) Self-predication versus other-predication. Aristotle distinguishes between a predication in which a term is said of itself and a predication in which a term is said of another. (Phy., Δ, 2, 209a31-33) j) Predicablity (Cat., 5, 3a36-b2): 1) Primary substances and individuals are not predicable. 2) Secondary substances are of two kinds: genus and species i) Genus is predicable able both of the species and of the individuals. ii) Species is predicable of the individual. 3) Differentiae are predicable both of the species and of the individuals. 8) Predication as classification a) Richard Patterson believes that Aristotle’s so repeated construction using hoper (estin A hoper B) in Topics (120a23 sq., 122b19, 26sq., 123a, 124a18, 125a29, 126a21, 128a35. Also in Posterior Analytics (83a24-30) (Brunschwig’s list. ‘expresses the fact that A is a kind of B (esti A B tis), that A is a species of the genus B.’ 9) Universal predication Aristotle defines universal predication (κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι) as such: ‘wherever no instance of the subject (τῶν τοῦ ὑποκειμέμνου) can be found of which the other term cannot be asserted.’ (PrA., A, 24b27-29) In this predication, the subject is included in another as in a whole (ἐν ὃλῳ εἶναι) and the predicate is predicated of all of the subject (κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι). (PrA., A, 24b26-27) Attach another discussion we had about ἐν ὃλῳ here. 10) Quantity of predication A predication, truly stated, has a quantity, which is the number of objects under the name of the subject of which the predicate is predicated. The quantity of subject can be stated in four ways: a. Indefinite: when the predicate belongs or does not belong to the subject without any mark to show to haw many of the particulars under the name of the subject it does or does not belong. E.g. ‘Man is white’; ‘Man is not white.’ (PrA., A, 24a20; OI., I, 7, 17b8-12) b. Universal quantity: When the predicate belongs to all or none of the subject. E.g. ‘Every man is animal’; ‘No man is animal.’ (PrA., A, 24a18-19; OI., I, 7, 17b5-6) The contrary of a predication of a universal quality is a predication of a universal quality. E.g. the contrary of ‘Every man is white’ is ‘No man is white.’ (OI., I, 7, 17b20-23) c. Particular quantity: When the predicate belongs (or does not belong) to some of the subject. E.g. ‘Some men are white’; ‘Some men are not white.’ (PrA., A, 24a19-20) d. Single quantity: when the subject is a proper name of only one object. E.g. ‘Socrates is white’; ‘Socrates is not white.’ The contrary of this predication is of a single quantity: ‘Socrates is not white.’ (OI., I, 7, 17b38-18a4) 11) Convertibility of predication. Some predications are convertible, that is, it is possible to change the place of subject and predicate in a true proposition so that the converted proposition remains true. This is supposed to mean that given the truth of a predication, the truth of the converted predication is inferable. The convert form of a predication depends on its quantity. a. Indefinite quantity: This predication has no strictly true convert because its quantity is not stated. b. Universal quantity: It can be converted in two ways: i) A negative universal can be converted to a negative universal in which the terms are changed. E.g. ‘No pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘No good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a5-8 and a14-19) ii) An affirmative universal can be converted to an affirmative particular in which the terms are changed. E.g. ‘Every pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘Some good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a7-9) c. Particular quantity: If it is negative, it cannot be converted but if it is affirmative, it can be converted to an affirmative predication with particular quantity. E.g. ‘Some pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘Some good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a10-13 and a20-24) d. Single quantity: It cannot be converted. 12) Characteristics of relations between subject and predicate 1. A predicate is of a wider range than its subject. It is based on this fact that Aristotle: a) Prevents individuals to be predicate because there is nothing of which an individual be of a wider range. In other words, it is due to the fact that since an individual is only ‘one particular’ thing and, thus, cannot be of a wider extent than anything that Aristotle prevents them of being a predicate. Matthews, however, thinks we cannot use Socrates, a substance and an individual, in the place of predicate and say it of Socrates because ‘Socrates does not classify Socrates: it names him.’ b) Prevents differentia, species and things under species to be predicated of genus. (To., Z, 6, 144a27-) c) Prevents the species and the things under it to be predicated of the differentia. (To., Z, 6, 144b1-4) d) Also about the effect because it is wider than its subject. (PsA., B, 17, 99a) e) Each attribute is wider than every individual it is predicated on, though several attributes, collectively considered, might not be wider but exactly the substance of a thing. (PsA., B, 13, 96a32-b1) 2. The predicate of a predicate of a subject will be predicated of the subject too: ‘whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject too.’ (Cat., 3, 1b10-15) In fact, it is due to its predication of the subject that it is predicated of its predicate. (Cat., 5, 2a36-b1) Moreover, what is not predicated of the predicate of a subject cannot be predicated of it as well. (PrA., A, 27, 43b22-27) Thus, what, for example, is not predicated of animal, cannot be predicated of man. 3. The predicate of a subject can be predicated of its predicates as well. (Cat., 5, 3a1-6) For example, you call the individual man grammatical and, thence, you call both a man and an animal grammatical. Nonetheless, the predicate of a subject belongs to it more properly than to its higher predicates. (PrA., A, 27, 43a27-32) 4. It is only the subject that can be distributed and not the predicate. (PrA., A, 27, 43b16-22; OI, I, 7, 17b12-16) Therefore, we can say e.g. ‘Every man is animal’ but we cannot say ‘Every man is every animal.’ 5. It is the reason of the relation between subjects and predicates, that is the reason of predication, which is the subject of inquiry. (Met., Z, 1041a20-24) In other words, since it is a meaningless inquiry to ask why a thing is itself (Met., Z, 1041a14-15), the only remaining meaningful inquiry is to ask why something is something else, i.e. to ask about the reason of predication. 6. A subject cannot categorize its predicate in the same category in which it is categorized by it. If e.g. A is a quality of B, B cannot be a quality of A. Therefore, there is no reciprocation in the same category. (PsA., A, 22, 83a36-39) 13) Characteristics of series of predications 1. A series of secondary accidental predication cannot go ad infinitum for not even more than two terms can be comnbined. For an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless it be because both are accidents of the same subject. (Met., Γ, 1007b1-4) 2. Infinite series cannot be traversed in thought. (PsA., A, 22, 83b6-7) 3. The predications of genera on each other must be ended and cannot go to infinity because otherwise not only substances would not be definable but also a genus would be equal to one of its own species. (PsA., A, 22, 83b7-10) Therefore, a series of predication of genera on each other must be limited on both sides. There must be an upward limit in general categories as well as a downward limit in individual because they cannot be predicated of others. Whatever lies between these limits can both be predicated of others and others be predicated of them. (PrA., A, 27, 43a36-43) 4. The order of predicates matters: it makes a difference whether the series be ABC or BAC. (PsA., B, 13, 96b25-32) . (shrink)

FISIOLOGIA DO CICLO ESTRAL DOS ANIMAIS -/- Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE Embrapa Semiárido e IPA -/- • _____OBJETIVO -/- O cio ou estro é a fase reprodutiva dos animais, onde as fêmeas apresentam receptividade sexual seguida de ovulação. Para tanto, é necessário entender a fisiologia do estro para a realização do manejo reprodutivo dos animais. Em geral, as fêmeas manifestam comportamentos fora do comum quando estão ciclando, tais comportamentos devem ser observados para que não percam o pico de ovulação (...) e, consequentemente, para que não perca o momento de monta ou inseminação para emprenhar o animal. Neste trabalho, o estudante compreenderá o ciclo estral identificando as diferenças entre as espécies domésticas, para considerá-las na manipulação do mesmo. -/- • _____INTRODUÇÃO -/- As fêmeas dos mamíferos domésticos apresentam, em sua vida reprodutiva, even-tos recorrentes conhecidos como ciclos estrais que se caracterizam por uma série de alte-rações ovarianas, genitais, endócrinas e comportamentais. Esses ciclos são o fundamento da reprodução e possuem a finalidade de que ocorra a ovulação de forma sincronizada com o acasalamento para conduzir a uma gestação. A compreensão deste é de suma im-portância para alcançar uma boa eficiência produtiva nas propriedades pecuárias; consi-derando que a oportunidade de gestar os animais se limita a períodos, em geral, muito curtos, que ocorrem em cada ciclo. Assim que as fêmeas atingem a puberdade, em bovinos entre 11 e 19 meses, inicia-se a apresentação dos ciclos estrais, o que geralmente indica o início da receptividade sexual, também chamada de "estro" ou "cio", por ser a fase mais fácil de reconhecer devido ao qual a fêmea busca, atrai e aceita a montaria do macho. Todavia, para uma melhor eficiência reprodutiva, as fêmeas que apresentarem o primeiro cio não devem ser colocadas à disposição do macho ou da IA, uma vez que ela ainda não possui o aporte e a condição corporal ideal para conseguir gestar; logo para serem colocadas à reprodução devem estar ao terceiro estro ou possuir entre 60 a 70% do seu peso vivo adulto. Depois da receptividade ocorre um período em que a fêmea não atrai nem aceita o macho. Assim, um ciclo estral é definido como o período entre um estro e o seguinte. Quando durante o ciclo estral ocorre uma cópula fértil, as fêmeas passam a uma fase de anestro fisiológico, causado pela gestação, em que cessa o ciclo estral e passam a não apresentarem atividade sexual. Nas espécies sazonais (cabras, éguas e ovelhas), a manifestação dos ciclos estrais também é limitada pela época do ano em que as fêmeas apresentam um anestro sazonal. Essas espécies sazonais ou estacionais apresentam cio durante a época em que os dias apresentam a presença de luz por mais tempo; isto é, dias mais longos. Deve-se considerar que a ciclicidade feminina pode ser alterada por eventos patológicos como processos infecciosos, persistência do corpo lúteo, desnutrição e estresse, entre outros. -/- • _____CONTROLE ENDÓCRINO DO CICLO ESTRAL -/- As mudanças ovarianas, genitais e comportamentais que ocorrem ao longo dos ciclos estrais são controladas pelo sistema endócrino e são o resultado de uma complexa interação entre hipotálamo, hipófise, ovário e útero. Vários hormônios participam desse processo, dos quais serão descritos a importância e a participação dos mais relevantes (figura 1). -/- Figura 1: Interação hormonal do eixo hipotálamo-hipófise-gonodal. No lado esquerdo, com linhas contínuas, os principais hormônios são exemplificados quando há um folículo pré-ovulatório. No lado direito, com linhas pontilhadas, os hormônios envolvidos são mostrados quando a estrutura ovariana predominante é o corpo lúteo. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. A Kisspeptina é um peptídeo hipotalâmico que tem sido denominado regulador central, pois os neurônios que a produzem recebem informações do meio ambiente e do próprio corpo, o que indica o momento ideal para a reprodução. Além de modular a secreção de GnRH durante o ciclo estral, esse hormônio controla tanto o início da puberdade quanto da estacionalidade reprodutiva. Além disso, é inibido durante a lactação, bloqueando a atividade reprodutiva das fêmeas nessa fase. Os neurônios produtores de Kisspeptina possuem receptores de estradiol, que os regulam para modular a liberação tônica e cíclica de GnRH, controlando assim a secreção de gonadotrofina; além disso, foi sugerida a participação de outros hormônios neurotransmissores e neuropeptídios na modulação da secreção de GnRH. Entre eles estão os estimuladores: norepinefrina, serotonina, aminoácidos excitatórios (principal-mente glutamato) e neurotensina. Atuando como inibidores: GABA e opioides endógenos (principalmente o β-endorfina). O GnRH é um neuropeptídio hipotalâmico que estimula a produção e liberação de LH, de forma que um pulso de LH é sempre precedido por um pulso de GnRH. Os estrogênios foliculares têm, por outro lado, um efeito de feedback positivo com o LH, aumentando a produção de GnRH pelo centro cíclico e a formação de seus receptores nos gonadotrópicos da hipófise. Como resultado, a maturação dos folículos ovarianos é alcançada e os picos pré-ovulatórios de estradiol e LH são alcançados. No centro tônico da secreção de GnRH, os estrogênios inibem a liberação desse hormônio quando os animais estão na vida pré-púbere ou nos estágios de anestro, e a sensibilidade a esse feedback negativo diminui durante os estágios reprodutivos. No sentido estrito, a liberação de FSH pelos gonadotrópicos hipofisários não requer a presença do GnRH, que participa antecipadamente do estímulo de sua síntese; o FSH é considerado, então, um hormônio secretado constitutivamente, ou seja, constantemente, a menos que haja um estímulo inibitório. Este estímulo inibitório existe graças aos estrogênios e à inibina, que são produzidos pelos folículos em desenvolvi-mento, especialmente pelo folículo dominante. A progesterona é um hormônio esteroide produzido pelo corpo lúteo (CL) que inibe a secreção de LH. Isso é realizado tanto indiretamente por meio da inibição da secreção de GnRH no nível hipotalâmico, quanto por ação direta no nível da hipófise, uma vez que bloqueia a formação de receptores de GnRH nos gonadotropos. Assim, diminui a frequência dos pulsos de LH, que é mantida em níveis basais capazes de participar da formação e manutenção do corpo lúteo, mas incapaz de causar ovulação. Na vaca, o papel do LH na manutenção do corpo lúteo é controverso, uma vez que alguns autores propõem que apenas o hormônio do crescimento participe para esse fim, pois a administração de inibidores de GnRH quando há corpo lúteo funcional não afeta a secreção de progesterona. Se a fertilização não for alcançada com sucesso, eventualmente o corpo lúteo deve ser destruído por apoptose (processo conhecido como luteólise), para permitir a ocorrência de um novo ciclo estral. Nesse caso, os hormônios participantes são a ocitocina, produzida inicialmente no nível central e posteriormente pelo CL; e a prostaglandina F2alfa (PGF2α), secretada pelo endométrio uterino ao final do diestro; entre ambos os hormônios estabelecerão um mecanismo de feedback positivo até que se complete a luteólise. -/- • _____FREQUÊNCIA DE APRESENTAÇÃO DOS CICLOS ESTRAIS -/- As espécies são classificadas de acordo com a frequência com que apresentam seus ciclos estrais em um dos três grupos existentes (figura 2). -/- Figura 2: classificação das espécies domésticas de acordo com a frequência de apresentação de seus ciclos estrais ao longo do ano. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Tabela 1: tipo e duração do ciclo estral de diferentes espécies Monoéstricas -/- São as espécies que apresentam um único ciclo estral, uma ou duas vezes ao ano, que culmina com um período de anestro, que faz parte do mesmo ciclo. Em geral, a fase de receptividade sexual dessas espécies é muito longa para garantir a fecundação. Dentro desta classificação está a família Canidae, que inclui cães domésticos, lobos e raposas. Os cães domésticos são capazes de se reproduzir em qualquer época do ano, portanto, não são considerados sazonais; apesar disso, observou-se que o estro tende a ocorrer com mais frequência no final do inverno ou início da primavera. Como exceção, a raça de cães Basenji é considerada sazonal, pois eles sempre têm seus ciclos férteis no outono. -/- Poliéstricas estacionais ou sazonais -/- São espécies que para garantir que seus filhotes nasçam na época do ano mais favorável à sua sobrevivência, apresentam uma série de ciclos estrais durante uma estação limitada do ano (figura 3). No final desta estação, os animais entram em anestro sazonal, que termina com o início da próxima estação reprodutiva. Dentro deste grupo estão as espécies que se reproduzem nas épocas do ano em que está aumentando a quantidade de horas-luz por dia ou fotoperíodo crescente (primavera-verão), como equinos e gatos; o último mostra a atividade ovariana entre janeiro e setembro (ou até outubro) nas zonas temperadas. Há outro grupo de espécies que se reproduzem em períodos de fotoperíodo decrescente (outono-inverno), entre as quais estão ovinos e caprinos. -/- Figura 3: classificação das espécies domésticas, de acordo com a estacionalidade de sua reprodutiva. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. Poliéstricas contínuas -/- As espécies deste grupo são caracterizadas por ciclos estrais durante todo o ano. Dentro desta classificação estão bovinos e suínos. -/- • _____ETAPAS DO CICLO ESTRAL -/- Do ponto de vista das estruturas ovarianas predominantes, o ciclo estral se divide em duas fases: a fase folicular, na qual os folículos ovarianos se desenvolvem e amadurecem, além da ovulação; nas espécies poliéstricas, esta fase começa com a regressão do corpo lúteo do ciclo anterior. A outra é conhecida como fase lútea e refere-se às etapas do ciclo em que o corpo lúteo se forma e tem sua maior funcionalidade. Cada uma dessas fases pode ser dividida em etapas de proestro e estro (fase folicular); e metaestro e diestro (fase lútea) (figura 4). Algumas espécies, adicionalmente, podem apresentar períodos de anestro e interestro, como parte de seus ciclos estrais (figura 4). -/- Figura 4: etapas dos ciclos estrais dos animais domésticos. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Fase folicular -/- É identificada porque os hormônios ovarianos predominantes são os estrogênios (produzidos pelos folículos em crescimento), que desencadeiam o comportamento sexual e fazem com que o aparelho reprodutor passe por algumas adaptações para atrair o macho, preparar-se para a cópula e facilitar o transporte dos gametas. O proestro começa quando as concentrações de progesterona do ciclo anterior baixem para níveis basais devido à regressão do CL; e termina quando o comportamento de receptividade sexual começa. É caracterizado pelo crescimento do folículo dominante da última onda folicular do ciclo anterior; portanto, sua duração depende do grau de desenvolvimento em que o folículo se encontra no momento da luteólise. Nesse estágio, aumenta-se a produção de estradiol e inibina secretada pelo folículo ou folículos que iniciaram seu desenvolvimento durante o final do período de diestro. As concentrações de FSH diminuem no início do proestro; entretanto, eles começam a aumentar à medida que o estro se aproxima. O LH, devido ao efeito do estradiol, passa a aumentar sua frequência de secreção e diminuir a amplitude de seus pulsos, o que acentua a produção de andrógenos pelas células da teca e a capacidade de aromatização das células da granulosa, com o consequente aumento na produção de estradiol. O aumento do estradiol desencadeia a apresentação comportamental do estro que também é conhecido como estágio de cio, calor ou receptividade sexual, uma vez que representa o único período em que a fêmea procura ativamente o macho e aceita a montagem e a cópula. O comportamento sexual pode variar em intensidade entre diferentes espécies. Durante a fase de estro, o(s) folículo(s) em desenvolvimento no ovário adquirem sua maturidade e tamanho pré-ovulatório (figura 5), atingindo as concentrações máximas de estradiol. Um feedback positivo é então exercido entre o estradiol, GnRH e LH, para que ocorra o pico de LH pré-ovulatório que será responsável pela ovulação. -/- Figura 5: folículos ovarianos de porcas. Esquerda: pequenos folículos, estágio de proestro. À direita: folículos pré-ovulatórios, estágio de estro. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- O estro é a fase do ciclo em que ocorre a ovulação em espécies domésticas, com exceção dos bovinos que ovulam durante o metaestro inicial. A ovulação, por outro lado, manifesta-se espontaneamente na maioria das espécies domésticas, com exceção dos felinos, leporídeos e camelídeos, nos quais a cópula deve ocorrer para induzi-la, por isso são conhecidos como espécies de ovulação induzida (figura 6). Nessas espécies, a cópula provoca um reflexo nervoso que atua no nível hipotalâmico para induzir a liberação de GnRH e, portanto, o pico pré-ovulatório de LH. Existem outras espécies em que a cópula não estimula a ovulação, mas é necessária para induzir a formação do CL (figura 6). Dentro dessas espécies estão ratos e camundongos. -/- Figura 6: classificação das espécies domésticas, segundo a espontaneidade da ovulação e a formação do corpo lúteo. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Em caninos, deve-se considerar que, embora tradicionalmente se diga que a ovulação ocorre dois dias após o início do estro, ela pode ocorrer mais tarde, em alguns casos ocorrendo próximo ao final do estro. Em geral, durante a fase folicular, o útero tem maior suprimento e as glândulas endometriais entram em fase proliferativa, aumentando seu tamanho. Isso faz com que o útero fique mais tônico, ou seja, mais firme, exceto no caso de éguas e carnívoros nos quais os estrogênios fazem com que o útero se encontre com edema e sem tonalidade, enquanto a cérvix aparece relaxada durante o estro. Além disso, o aumento do suprimento de sangue causa hiperemia e congestão do epitélio vaginal e vulvar (figura 7). Para permitir a passagem do esperma, a cérvix se abre e a produção de um muco cervical muito fluido, cristalino e abundante é aumentada; o útero e o oviduto aumentam suas contrações. Nessa última ação participam as prostaglandinas contidas no plasma seminal (PGF₂α e PGE). Na vagina, o número de camadas de células do epitélio começa a aumentar e as células da superfície tornam-se cornificadas. No caso da cadela, a situação hormonal durante a fase folicular é completamente diferente do resto das espécies domésticas (figura 8), uma vez que há altas concentrações de estrógenos durante o proestro, que atingem seu nível máximo 24 a 48 h antes de seu término; ao mesmo tempo, os folículos iniciam sua luteinização, antes de serem ovulados. Essa situação provoca a liberação de progesterona, que começa a aumentar suas concen-trações; à medida que aumenta, as concentrações de estradiol começam a cair. Assim, o estro começa quando os níveis de progesterona atingem uma concentração de cerca de 1 ng/ml. O pico de LH ocorre durante a transição do proestro para o estro e a ovulação ocorre 48 a 60 horas depois; processo que pode se estender de 24 a 96 h. Os níveis de progesterona aumentam após o início do estro, de modo que antes da ovulação estão entre 2 e 4 ng/ml, enquanto as concentrações entre 5 e 10 ng/ml estão relacionadas ao tempo de ovulação. Uma vez que as concentrações de estradiol caem abaixo de 15 pg/ml, o estro é encerrado (figura 8). -/- Figura 7: comparação da aparência vulvar em porcas. O círculo azul indica a vulva de uma porca que não está em estro, enquanto um círculo vermelho mostra uma vulva apresentando hiperemia e edema característicos da fase de estro. Fonte: Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- As altas concentrações de estradiol no proestro são responsáveis pela atração da fêmea pelo macho a partir desta fase, porém, não apresentará comportamento receptivo até o início da fase de estro. Deve-se levar em consideração que algumas cadelas podem não aceitar o macho, apesar de estarem endócrinamente na fase de estro, o que pode ser atribuído às condições de manejo, aos comportamentos adquiridos ou às características hierárquicas, ou ainda a distúrbios relacionados a endocrinologia da reprodução (anorma-lidades hormonais e/ou baixas concentrações de hormônios). No caso das éguas, não há menção à fase de proestro e os eventos que ocorreriam nessa fase estão englobados no estro, que tradicionalmente será denominado fase folicular ou simplesmente estro (figura 9). -/- Figura 8: Endocrinologia do ciclo estral da cadela. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Figura 9: duração das etapas do ciclo estral das éguas. A ovulação ocorre nos últimos 2 dias da fase de estro. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Fase lútea -/- Durante essa fase, o esteroide ovariano predominante é a progesterona, cujo objetivo é manter a gravidez se a fertilização for bem-sucedida. Para isso, os estrogênios pré-ovulatórios favorecem a formação de receptores de progesterona uterina, então a presença da progesterona faz com que as glândulas endometriais entrem em sua fase secretora e iniciem a produção de histiotrofo ou leite uterino, para nutrir o produto que poderia estar potencialmente presente. Já na fase lútea, ocorre redução das concentrações de estrogênio, o que causa diminuição do tônus uterino, hiperemia e edema vulvar. Por fim, a cérvix se fecha e o muco cervical torna-se espesso, pegajoso, opaco e menos abundante, de modo a isolar o útero por fora, evitando a entrada de microrganismos que poderiam comprometer a possível gravidez. O metaestro começa quando a fêmea deixa de aceitar a montaria do macho e termina quando há um CL funcional bem estabelecido. Este estágio corresponde ao período de transição entre a dominância estrogênica e o aumento das concentrações de progesterona. Nesse estágio, as concentrações de FSH são aumentadas pela queda repentina de estradiol e inibina após a ovulação, o que permite o recrutamento da primeira onda folicular. Nesta fase, o ovário contém o corpo hemorrágico, a partir do qual se desenvolverá o CL (figura 10). O corpo hemorrágico tem meia-vida muito curta, pois as células que compõem suas paredes iniciam sua luteinização imediatamente após ou mesmo antes da ovulação. -/- Figura 10: ovários bovinos. Corpo hemorrágico (CH); folículos (F) e corpo lúteo (CL). -/- O diestro, por sua vez, constitui a etapa mais longa do ciclo estral e é caracterizado por um CL que se encontra em sua atividade secretora máxima. Somente no final dessa fase, e se não houver fecundação, o CL sofre luteólise; caso contrário, o CL é mantido de forma a preservar a gestação, prolongando um estado fisiológico semelhante ao do diestro. A imagem 11 esquematiza o ciclo estral da vaca, eventos ovarianos e endócrinos, bem como a duração das etapas do ciclo estral. Nessa fase, a progesterona atinge suas concentrações máximas e exerce efeito negativo na liberação de LH, pois inibe a formação de receptores de GnRH nos gonadotropos hipofisários, bem como a secreção de GnRH pelo hipotálamo. Além disso, observam-se aumentos repetidos da secreção de FSH com o consequente aumento do desenvolvimento folicular e das concentrações plasmáticas de estradiol e inibina. No entanto, os folículos que começam seu desenvolvimento, não conseguem completar sua maturação e sofrem regressão (ondas foliculares). A égua é a única fêmea doméstica que pode ovular naturalmente durante a fase lútea, com uma incidência de ovulação de 10-25% nesta fase. Figura 11: etapas, estruturas ovarianas e endocrinologia do ciclo estral da vaca. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- No final do diestro, os estrogênios sensibilizam o endométrio, de modo que as células epiteliais formam os receptores de ocitocina. Após uma primeira secreção de ocitocina da neurohipófise e secreções subsequentes originadas do corpo lúteo, um mecanismo de feedback positivo é iniciado para a secreção de PGF2α. O papel da PGF2α é destruir o CL quando não houver fertilização. Deve-se considerar que para o útero ser capaz de produzir PGF2α deve haver um período prévio de exposição à progesterona, durante o qual aumenta o conteúdo de precursores das prostaglandinas no endométrio, como o ácido araquidônico (ácido graxo C20H32O2). O anestro é considerado como um período de inatividade reprodutiva, mesmo quando continua havendo atividade hormonal e desenvolvimento folicular, uma vez que o estímulo é insuficiente para que ocorra a maturação folicular e a ovulação. Ao longo desta fase não haverá alterações comportamentais ou morfológicas nas fêmeas. Nas espécies estacionais ou sazonais, o anestro é muito importante, pois limita a estação reprodutiva de forma que os partos ocorram na época do ano que pode ser mais favorável para a sobrevivência dos filhotes. Em espécies poliéstricas contínuas, o anestro aparecerá em casos de processos fisiológicos como gestação ou amamentação, ou devido a condições patológicas que interrompem a ciclicidade. Em caninos, o anestro é considerado mais uma fase do ciclo estral (figura 12), e é o estágio de transição entre o diestro de um ciclo e o proestro do próximo; na verdade, o anestro é a fase mais longa do ciclo nessa espécie, pois pode durar de 4 a 10 meses, dependendo do indivíduo. Em algumas espécies de animais domésticos, o anestro pode ocorrer pós-parto. O interestro é uma fase de repouso entre as ondas foliculares e é característica do ciclo estral de espécies cuja ovulação é induzida, como os felinos e camelídeos, por exemplo, a lhama e a alpaca. Ao longo desta fase, não há comportamento sexual. Sua apresentação se deve ao fato de a monta não ter ocorrido ou de não ter sido capaz de induzir a ovulação, de modo que os folículos ovarianos regridem, dando origem a um novo recrutamento folicular. No caso dos felinos, foi relatado que até 50% das cópulas simples são insuficientes para causar ovulação. -/- Figura 12: etapas do ciclo estral da cadela. A ovulação ocorre dois dias após o início do cio. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- • _DURAÇÃO DOS CICLOS ESTRAIS E PARTICULARIDADES POR ESPÉCIE -/- As variações na duração do ciclo estral e as fases presentes entre as diferentes espécies domésticas são indicadas na tabela 2. Em particular, existe uma grande variação entre os indivíduos dependendo da duração das fases do ciclo estral em caninos e felinos, sendo difícil precisar sua duração, já que no caso da cadela o anestro é parte integrante do ciclo; na gata, a duração do ciclo anovulatório é diferente daquele em que ocorreu a ovulação. Assim, em um ciclo anovulatório, a gata pode manifestar períodos de estro de sete dias em média, seguidos de 2 a 19 dias sem estro (período denominado interestro), que são continuados com outro período de estro. Quando ocorre a ovulação e não é fértil, surge uma fase lútea de 35 a 37 dias e às vezes demora mais 35 dias para o animal apresentar um novo estro. Em cadelas, não há estágio de metaestro propriamente dito, pois a ovulação ocorre no início do estro, de forma que, ao término do comportamento sexual, os corpos lúteos já estão formados. Da mesma forma, as gatas não apresentam este estágio, portanto, se ocorrer ovulação, a fase de estro é imediatamente seguida pela fase diestro (figura 13). Figura 13: etapas e endocrinologia do ciclo estral da gata. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Tabela 2: Duração do ciclo estral e suas fases nas diferentes espécies domésticas Espécie Ciclo (dias) Proestro (dias) Estro Metaestro (dias) Diestro (dias) Interestro (dias) Anestro Bovina 21 (17-24) 2 a 3 8-18 h 3 a 5 12 a 14 - Pós-parto (vacas de leite) Lactacional (vacas de corte) Ovina 17 (13-19) 2 24-36 h 2 a 3 12 - Estacional Caprina 21 2 a 3 36 h (24-48) 3 a 5 8 a 15 - Estacional Suína 21 (17-25) 2 24-72 h 2 14 - Lactacional Equina 21 (15-26) - 4-7 d - 14 a 15 - Estacional Canina - 9 (3-20) 9 d (3-20) - 63 ± 5 em gestantes 70 a 80 em vazias - 4 a 10 meses Felina - 1 a 2 7 d (2-19) - 35 a 37 8 (2-19) Estacional (30-90 d) Onde: d = dias. h = horas. -/- O ciclo estral das éguas é dividido apenas em duas fases, folicular e lútea; às vezes também conhecido como estro e diestro, respectivamente (figura 14). No caso de bovinos, a ovulação ocorre durante a fase de metaestro, entre quatro e 16 horas após o término do estro, ou de 30 a 36 horas após o início do estro (figura 15). Uma vez que a ovulação ocorre, e como consequência da queda repentina nas concentrações de estradiol, algumas vacas podem ter uma secreção vulvar sanguinolenta (figura 16). -/- Figura 14: endocrinologia do ciclo estral da égua. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Figura 15: duração das etapas do ciclo estral das vacas. A ovulação ocorre no metaestro ou de 4 a 16 horas depois do término do cio. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Figura 16: secreção vulvar sanguinolenta em vaca no estágio de metaestro • ___DESENVOLVIMENTO FOLICULAR -/- Embora o desenvolvimento folicular que leva à ovulação ocorra na fase folicular do ciclo estral e desempenhe um papel essencial no controle do ciclo, durante a fase lútea também ocorre o desenvolvimento folicular, mas os folículos não conseguem realizar sua maturação final e ovulação; mesmo em animais pré-púberes e em animais em anestro, há crescimento folicular. Por isso o desenvolvimento folicular é considerado um processo constante e dinâmico. As fêmeas têm certo número de folículos e ovócitos desde o nascimento, que em geral excede consideravelmente o número de oócitos que serão ovulados ao longo de suas vidas. Aproximadamente 90% dos folículos ovarianos começam a crescer, mas não ovulam e regridem, fato conhecido como atresia folicular. Estima-se que a atresia ocorra em qualquer época de desenvolvimento, mas é mais comum nos estágios dependentes de gonadotrofinas. A razão pela qual as ondas foliculares se desenvolvem durante a fase lútea, culminando na atresia, é que a progesterona produzida pelo corpo lúteo inibe a pulsação de LH. Assim, os folículos dominantes não obtêm suprimento suficiente desse hormônio para completar seu crescimento e ovular, causando sua regressão. Quando os folículos sofrem atresia, cessa a produção de estradiol e inibina, retomando a secreção de FSH, iniciando um novo recrutamento folicular. No final do período de diestro, quando as concentrações de progesterona começam a diminuir devido à luteólise, os estrogênios foliculares estimulam a secreção de LH, que fornece suporte suficiente para o crescimento e maturação dos folículos até que a ovulação seja desencadeada. -/- • ___OVULAÇÃO -/- A ovulação ocorre graças a um processo de remodelação, adelgaçamento e ruptura da parede folicular ao nível do estigma, que é uma área de tecido desprovida de vascularização, que se forma na superfície do folículo ovulatório (figura 17). Nas espécies domésticas, o folículo pode se desenvolver e ovular em qualquer parte da superfície do ovário, com exceção dos equinos, nos quais, devido à conformação anatômica característica do ovário desta espécie, a ovulação sempre ocorre ao nível da fossa de ovulação. O pico de LH que precede a ovulação estimula a síntese e a liberação local de PGE₂ e PGF₂α, bem como o início da produção de progesterona pelas células foliculares. Junto com o pico pré-ovulatório de LH, ocorre aumento da quantidade de fluido folicular, graças ao aumento da permeabilidade vascular da teca (ação estimulada em conjunto com a PGE₂) e ao aumento do suprimento sanguíneo no período pré-ovulatório; entretanto, a pressão intrafolicular não aumenta porque a parede do folículo está distendida. -/- Figura 17: ruptura do estigma folicular durante o processo de ovulação. Fonte: Internet. -/- A ovulação começa com um enfraquecimento da parede folicular, porque a PGF₂α causa a liberação de enzimas lisossomais das células da granulosa do folículo pré-ovulatório. O aumento local da progesterona faz com que as células da teca interna sintetizem colagenase, uma enzima que cliva as cadeias de colágeno do tecido conjuntivo, enfraquecendo a túnica albugínea que constitui a parede folicular. À medida que a parede enfraquece, forma o estigma - projeção avascular - na região apical, o que indica que a ovulação está se aproximando. O estigma é o local onde o folículo se rompe, permitindo a liberação do oócito, que sai envolto pelas células da coroa irradiada e acompanhado pelo fluido contido no antro folicular. -/- • ___CORPO LÚTEO -/- Após a ovulação, as células que permanecem na cavidade folicular desenvolvem um CL, que é considerado uma glândula temporária; sua função essencial é a produção hormonal e só está presente durante o diestro, na gestação e em algumas patologias como a piometra. A luteinização, ou formação do CL, é mediada principalmente pelo LH; no entanto, outros hormônios também estão envolvidos, como o hormônio do crescimento (GH). Assim, o tratamento com GH em animais hipofisectomizados foi encontrado para restaurar a função normal do CL; enquanto em espécies como roedores e caninos, a formação do CL é induzida e mantida pela prolactina, hormônio que não participa com essa finalidade no caso dos ruminantes. Durante a luteinização, os remanescentes das células da granulosa se diferenciam em grandes células lúteas, que são capazes de secretar progesterona continuamente (basal), e possuem grânulos secretores responsáveis pela produção e liberação de ocitocina e relaxina, esta última durante a gestação de algumas espécies. Enquanto as células da teca formam as pequenas células lúteas, que não secretam ocitocina e produzem progesterona em resposta ao LH (tônico). O corpo lúteo é, finalmente, constituído de células luteais grandes e pequenas, fibroblastos, células mioides, células endoteliais e células do sistema imunológico. Outro fator importante para o processo de luteinização é a formação de uma rede vascular, essencial para aumentar o fluxo sanguíneo para o CL. A referida formação vascular é mediada principalmente por dois fatores, fator de crescimento de fibroblastos (FGF), que no estágio inicial do desenvolvimento lúteo estimula a proliferação de células endoteliais pela ação de LH, e fator de crescimento endotélio-vascular (VEGF) que promove a invasão de células endoteliais para a camada de células da granulosa e a organização e manutenção da microvasculatura do CL. A luteólise é um processo essencial para retomar a ciclicidade das fêmeas. Sucede ao final do diestro quando não ocorre a fecundação e consiste na desintegração funcional e estrutural do CL. O primeiro refere-se à queda nas concentrações de progesterona, enquanto o segundo abrange a regressão anatômica da estrutura lútea e a recuperação do tamanho normal do ovário. A desintegração funcional, com a consequente queda nas concentrações de progesterona, ocorre antes que a regressão estrutural seja observada. Caso ocorra a gestação, a vida do CL é prolongada, visto que existem mecanismos que o resgatam de sua regressão. Durante o diestro, a progesterona produzida pelo CL bloqueia inicialmente a ação do estradiol e da ocitocina. Para esse último, causa uma redução no número de receptores de ocitocina endometrial, modificando sua estrutura. Desta forma, não é possível estabelecer um feedback positivo entre a ocitocina e a PGF₂α, que será responsável pela luteólise. No entanto, à medida que o diestro progride, a progesterona esgota seus próprios receptores, de modo que, no final desse estágio, ela perde a capacidade de inibir os receptores de ocitocina. O estradiol ativa, então, o centro de geração de pulso de ocitocina no hipotálamo e começa a induzir o endométrio tanto a formação de seus próprios receptores como os da ocitocina. A ocitocina e o estradiol trabalham juntos para aumentar a atividade e a concentração das enzimas envolvidas na síntese de PGF2α: a fosfolipase (enzima responsável pela liberação de ácido araquidônico de fosfolipídios da membrana celular) e a prostaglandina sintetase (enzima responsável pela transformação do ácido araquidônico em prostaglandina). Dessa forma, a ocitocina hipotalâmica, liberada de forma pulsátil pela neurohipófise, estimula inicialmente a síntese e secreção de PGF2α através do endométrio. A PGF2α possui receptores em grandes células do CL, que aumentam seu número à medida que o ciclo estral progride. Assim, quando a PGF2α endometrial atinge o ovário provoca a liberação de ocitocina lútea, desencadeando um mecanismo local de feedback positivo, que agindo no endométrio aumenta a secreção de PGF2α. Este circuito continua até que se alcance uma frequência de pulsos de PGF2α de aproximadamente cinco pulsos em 24 h, uma frequência que é capaz de desencadear a luteólise. Em equinos, o CL não produz ocitocina; no entanto, as células endometriais os produzem, então a secreção por PGF2α depende do estímulo da ocitocina que vem desta última fonte e da hipófise. Ressalte-se que o CL deve atingir certo grau de maturidade para que possa ser receptivo à ação da PGF2α. Isso é conseguido através da formação de receptores para a PGF2α e desenvolvendo a capacidade de expressar a prostaglandina sintetase, de modo que o CL requer para produzir PGF2α na forma autócrina para atingir a lise. As células endoteliais e as células imunes, típicas do CL, também intervêm no processo de luteólise estrutural. As células endoteliais secretam proteína quimiotática de monócitos (MCP-1), para recrutar macrófagos que migram através do epitélio vascular que foi sensibilizado pela PGF2α. Os macrófagos ativados secretam o fator necrose tumoral alfa (TNFα) que atua sobre as células do corpo lúteo causando apoptose celular. A PGF2α também participa da luteólise funcional, inibindo a síntese de progesterona e reduzindo a síntese e fosforilação da proteína responsável pelo transporte de colesterol para a mitocôndria (StAR). Além disso, a PGF2α induz a produção de endotelina-1 (ET1) pelas células endoteliais encontradas no corpo lúteo, as quais contribuem para uma redução na síntese de progesterona. -/- • ___FATORES QUE AFETAM O CICLO ESTRAL -/- A apresentação dos ciclos estrais é natural e impreterível; no entanto pode ser afetada por fatores ambientais como o fotoperíodo, e fatores específicos do indivíduo como a sociabilidade e amamentação, além dos fatores de manejo como a nutrição e, consequentemente, o ECC das fêmeas e a endocrinologia (hormônios). Todos esses fatores serão explicados a seguir. -/- Fotoperíodo -/- O fotoperíodo é determinado pelo número de horas de luz do dia ao longo do ano e é considerado um dos fatores ambientais mais consistentes e repetíveis. A quantidade diária de horas-luz tem maior efeito nas espécies sazonais para determinar o início da atividade reprodutiva. No entanto, em espécies poliéstricas contínuas, variações anuais na ciclicidade também podem ser observadas, um exemplo disso é a acentuada sazonalidade nos nascimentos de búfalos e zebuínos. Da mesma forma, o momento em que uma bezerra ou leitão nasce afeta a idade em que atinge a puberdade, e a explicação para isso é que o fotoperíodo a que estão expostos impacta seu desenvolvimento. Assim, observou-se que uma maior quantidade de horas de luz do dia (suplementação de quatro horas por dia por cerca de dois meses) pode adiantar o início da puberdade em novilhas. -/- Amamentação -/- Em espécies como suínos e bovinos de corte, o anestro pós-parto é mantido pelo estímulo que a prole exerce sobre a mãe no momento da amamentação. Dessa forma, sob esses estímulos a fêmea deixará de apresentar cio enquanto estiver alimentando as crias (figura 18). Na ação de amamentação, pensa-se que participa o reconhecimento filial, onde intervêm a visão, o olfato e a audição. A verdade é que a participação de estímulos táteis é questionável, visto que foram realizados estudos nos quais a denervação da glândula mamária não antecipou o reinício da ciclicidade em fêmeas que amamentavam seus filhotes. O mecanismo pelo qual a amamentação afeta a atividade reprodutiva está relacionado a um aumento da sensibilidade do hipotálamo ao efeito inibitório do estradiol. Nisso intervêm os fatores como os opioides (endorfinas, encefalinas e dinorfinas) e os glicocorticoides. -/- Figura 18: na esquerda porca amamentando seus filhotes e a direita vaca com o bezerro no pé. -/- Nutrição -/- A função reprodutiva depende da existência de um consumo de energia superior ao necessário para manter as funções fisiológicas essenciais do corpo e as funções de produção, como termorregulação, locomoção, crescimento, manutenção celular ou lactação. Considera-se que o efeito da nutrição na atividade reprodutiva é maior nas fêmeas do que nos machos, devido a uma maior demanda de energia exigida pelas fêmeas para manter uma gestação do começo ao fim (figura 19). Quando o consumo de energia é insuficiente, a função reprodutiva é bloqueada para não comprometer as funções vitais. Desta forma, os animais pré-púberes que sofreram deficiências nutricionais durante o seu crescimento apresentam um atraso no início da sua atividade reprodutiva. Assim, existem sinais metabólicos ao nível do sistema nervoso central, como o IGF-I e a leptina, que indicam ao organismo o grau de desenvolvimento somático do indivíduo. Animais adultos que já iniciaram sua atividade reprodutiva também podem ser afetados pela nutrição, de forma que sua ciclicidade pode ser interrompida por perdas de peso corporal igual ou superior a 20%. Da mesma forma, o reinício da atividade ovariana pós-parto é retardado quando as fêmeas estão submetidas a dietas deficientes em proteínas, energia, minerais etc. -/- Figura 19: comparação das condições corporais em vacas leiteiras. À esquerda: uma vaca com uma condição corporal adequada, que está ciclando normalmente. À direita: vaca em péssimo estado corporal e, portanto, em anestro. -/- As deficiências nutricionais de energia e proteína não afetam diretamente os níveis circulantes de FSH em animais intactos, mas o efeito da desnutrição pode ser mascarado por feedback negativo dos hormônios ováricos sobre a secreção de FSH, uma vez que os animais ovariectomizados com uma boa condição corporal têm maiores concentrações de FSH que os de condição corporal pobre. Em contraste, a secreção de LH é altamente sensível a deficiências nutricionais e a mudanças na condição corporal. O diâmetro do folículo dominante é reduzido quando os animais estão a perder peso, o que se correlaciona com uma diminuição na produção de estradiol, o que diminui a secreção de LH e consequentemente é evitada a maturação folicular terminal e a ovulação, o que os animais entrarem em anestro. No pós-parto, a ciclicidade se recupera quando as concentrações basal e média de LH, bem como a sua frequência de secreção aumenta para exceder o nadir do balanço energético (este último é atingido quando o fornecimento de energia está no ponto mínimo e está excedido pelas exigências de mantença do organismo). O ECC possui relação direta com as taxas reprodutivas dos animais. Em bovinos um ECC ideal é entre 3,5 e 4,5 para o período reprodutivo. Com relação do ECC sobre o estro, estima-se que num rebanho de 100 vacas com ECC 2,5 cerca de 47 entram em cio, e dessas apenas 27 conseguem conceber. Por outro lado, no mesmo rebanho de 100 vacas, mas com ECC igual a 3, cerca de 62 vacas entram em cio normalmente e dessas 40 conseguem engravidar. Já com um ECC 3,5, 68 vacas entram em estro normalmente e dessas 46 conseguem engravidar. -/- Efeitos independentes de gonadotropinas -/- A importância das gonadotropinas no crescimento e maturação folicular já foi revisada neste trabalho; também deve ser mencionado que, além das gonadotropinas, existem outros fatores que podem intervir na regulação do desenvolvimento folicular e da ciclicidade. Um exemplo do anterior é o flushing: manejo nutricional que consiste na suplementação de uma fonte energética de rápida absorção, em que o aumento do número de folículos em desenvolvimento tem inicialmente um controle independente do eixo hipotálamo-hipófise-gonodal e é mediado por fatores que participam do controle do metabolismo energético do animal, que estão intimamente relacionados às mudanças nutricionais. Esses fatores incluem insulina, fator de crescimento semelhante à insulina I (IGF-I) e hormônio do crescimento (GH). O IGF-I é secretado principalmente pelo fígado em resposta à estimulação do GH e é creditado na regulação de muitas das ações do GH, portanto, quando o GH é administrado, as concentrações de insulina e IGF-I estão aumentadas e um aumento no número de folículos ovarianos é observado em suínos, bovinos, caprinos e ovinos. O IGF-I, da mesma forma, modula a secreção de GH por um efeito de feedback negativo, de modo que no início do pós-parto, quando o animal está em balanço energético negativo, as concentrações de insulina e IGF-I diminuem, enquanto as de GH aumentam. A insulina e o IGF-I estimulam a proliferação e esteroidogênese das células da granulosa e da teca no folículo. Outro fator que interfere na manifestação da atividade reprodutiva é a quantidade de gordura corporal. -/- Fatores sociais (sociabilidade) -/- Existem diferentes interações sociais que são capazes de modificar o início da atividade reprodutiva durante o período de transição para a puberdade ou para a estação reprodutiva, ou ainda de sincronização e manifestação dos ciclos estrais. Entre os fatores sociais o efeito fêmea-fêmea foi bem documentado em pequenos ruminantes, onde a introdução de fêmeas ciclando (em cio) a um grupo de fêmeas em anestro estacional adianta a estação reprodutiva induzindo e sincronizando a ovulação. Quando as porcas pré-púberes, por outro lado, são alojadas em pequenos grupos de dois ou três animais, o início da puberdade é retardado em comparação com indivíduos alojados em grupos maiores. A bioestimulação das fêmeas através do contato com um macho é conhecida como efeito macho (figura 20). Foi determinado que imediatamente após a introdução do macho se inicia o desenvolvimento e maturação folicular como uma resposta a um aumento na secreção de LH. Esse efeito será explicado em próximos trabalhos de minha autoria. -/- Estresse -/- Em vários estudos, foi demonstrado que o estresse pode bloquear a ciclicidade, devido ao aumento nas concentrações de corticosteroides ou opioides que causam redução na resposta da hipófise ao GnRH. Alojamentos inadequados, um ambiente social adverso e deficiências no manejo são considerados condições estressantes. -/- Figura 20: efeito do macho sobre as fêmeas (suínos). -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- AURICH, Christine. Reproductive cycles of horses. Animal reproduction science, v. 124, n. 3-4, p. 220-228, 2011. AISEN, Eduardo G. Reprodução ovina e caprina. MedVet, 2008. BARTLEWSKI, Pawel M.; BABY, Tanya E.; GIFFIN, Jennifer L. Reproductive cycles in sheep. Animal reproduction science, v. 124, n. 3-4, p. 259-268, 2011. 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Animal reproduction science, v. 124, n. 3-4, p. 211-219, 2011. FERREIRA, A. de M. Reprodução da fêmea bovina: fisiologia aplicada e problemas mais comuns (causas e tratamentos). Juiz de Fora: Minas Gerais–Brasil, p. 422, 2010. FORDE, N. et al. Oestrous cycles in Bos taurus cattle. Animal reproduction science, v. 124, n. 3-4, p. 163-169, 2011. HAFEZ, Elsayed Saad Eldin; HAFEZ, Bahaa. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. HIDALGO, Galina et al. Reproducción de animales domésticos. México: Limusa, 2008. HOPPER, Richard M. (Ed.). Bovine reproduction. John Wiley & Sons, 2014. MCKINNON, Angus O. et al. (Ed.). Equine reproduction. John Wiley & Sons, 2011. MEIDAN, R. et al. Intraovarian regulation of luteolysis. JOURNAL OF REPRODUCTION AND FERTILITY-SUPPLEMENT-, p. 217-228, 1999. NETT, T. M. et al. Pituitary receptors for GnRH and estradiol, and pituitary content of gonadotropins in beef cows. I. Changes during the estrous cycle. 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RIPPE, Christian A. El ciclo estral. In: Dairy Cattle Reproduction Conference. 2009. p. 111-116. SANGHA, G. K.; SHARMA, R. K.; GURAYA, S. S. Biology of corpus luteum in small ruminants. Small Ruminant Research, v. 43, n. 1, p. 53-64, 2002. SARTORI, R.; BARROS, C. M. Reproductive cycles in Bos indicus cattle. Animal Reproduction Science, v. 124, n. 3-4, p. 244-250, 2011. SENGER, Phillip L. et al. Pathways to pregnancy and parturition. Current Conceptions, Inc., 1615 NE Eastgate Blvd., 1997. SMITH, Matthew J.; JENNES, Lothar. Neural signals that regulate GnRH neurones directly during the oestrous cycle. Reproduction (Cambridge, England), v. 122, n. 1, p. 1-10, 2001. SOEDE, N. M.; LANGENDIJK, P.; KEMP, B. Reproductive cycles in pigs. Animal reproduction science, v. 124, n. 3-4, p. 251-258, 2011. WEBB, R. et al. Mechanisms regulating follicular development and selection of the dominant follicle. REPRODUCTION-CAMBRIDGE-SUPPLEMENT-, p. 71-90, 2003. WHITTEMORE, Colin et al. The science and practice of pig production. Blackwell Science Ltd, 1998. -/- FIXAÇÃO DO ASSUNTO -/- 1. Disserte sobre o papel do eixo hipotálamo-hipófise-gonadal sobre o ciclo estral dos animais domésticos. -/- 2. Qual a importância do controle endócrino para a apresentação do estro? -/- 3. De acordo com a frequência do ciclo estral, como se classificam as vacas, porcas, éguas, gatas, cadelas, cabras e ovelhas? -/- 4. Defina e diferencia monoéstricas e poliéstricas. -/- 5. Um produtor possui fêmeas em primeiro cio, e deseja introduzi-las na vida reprodutiva. Explique por que não é ideal utilizar fêmeas em primeiro cio na vida reprodutiva? -/- 6. Quais são as etapas do ciclo estral? -/- 7. Defina e diferencia fase folicular e fase lútea. -/- 8. Defina e diferencie os tipos de ovulação e formação do corpo lúteo nas espécies domésticas? -/- 9. Quais os eventos ocorrem durante as fases proestro, estro, metaestro, diestro e inter-estro. -/- 10. Explique por que a égua possui ciclo diferente da vaca? -/- 11. Disserte e diferencie a endocrinologia do ciclo estral da cadela, da égua, da gata e da vaca? -/- 12. Fale sobre o desenvolvimento folicular durante o ciclo estral. -/- 13. Disserte sobre a ovulação das fêmeas domésticas. -/- 14. Defina e diferencie luteinização e luteólise. -/- 15. Disserte sobre os principais fatores que afetam a apresentação e manifestação do ciclo estral. -/- 16. Qual o papel da nutrição e do ECC sobre o ciclo estral? -/- 17. Defina e diferencie efeito fêmea-fêmea e efeito macho sobre a apresentação do estro nas fêmeas. -/- 18. Um produtor de ruminantes possui um rebanho de 10 bezerras, 10 cabritas e 10 cordeiras, todas com 1 mês de idade. Elabore um projeto reprodutivo para que essas fêmeas tenham seu primeiro parto após ciclos estrais normais e sem complicações. -/- Leve em consideração os fatores de idade ao primeiro cio ou a puberdade que é diferente entre as espécies, bem como aos fatores que podem afetar a manifestação do cio. (shrink)